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THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN ENCOURAGING FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
KEITH E. MASKUS*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The global system of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is un-
dergoing profound change as we approach the next century.  Re-
cently numerous developing countries significantly strengthened their
IPR regimes.1  Regional trading arrangements, such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)2 and a series of Partner-
ship Agreements under negotiation between the European Union
and various Eastern European and Middle Eastern nations,3 now pay
significant attention to IPR issues.  Most important of these agree-
ments is the multilateral Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  Under the terms of TRIPS, cur-
rent and future members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
must adopt and enforce strong, non-discriminatory minimum stan-
dards of intellectual property protection.  While considerable contro-
versy persists over international means of protecting key information
* Professor of Economics, University of Colorado, Boulder.
1. Examples of developing countries that have strengthened their IPR regimes include
Republic of Korea, China, Taiwan, Argentina, and Mexico.  See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEV. at 7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1, U.N. Sales No. 96.II.D.10 (1996); Keith E.
Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Asia: Implications for Australia, 37
AUSTL. ECON. PAPERS 346, 348-49 (1998).
2. See North American Free Trade Agreement Dec. 8, 1992 Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
289.  The North American Free Trade Agreement has a full chapter devoted to intellectual
property rights (Chapter 17 of the NAFTA).  See Keith E. Maskus, Implications of Regional
and Multilateral Agreements for Intellectual Property Rights, 20 WORLD ECON. 681, 685-87
(1997).
3. The Partnership Agreements with the European Union are preferential trade areas
negotiated on a bilateral basis between the European Union, on the one hand, and a number of
North African and Mediterranean states, on the other hand.  Examples of the latter include
Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon.  The preferences offered regarding market
access vary across the agreements.  See Robert Z. Lawrence, Preferential Trading Arrange-
ments: The Traditional and the New, in REGIONAL PARTNERS IN GLOBAL MARKETS: LIMITS
AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE EURO-MED AGREEMENTS 13, 28-30 (Ahmed Galal & Bernard
Hoekman eds., 1997).
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technologies, including databases and electronic information transfer,
there is nevertheless an evident commitment to achieving strong pro-
tection in these areas.4
This global trend toward markedly stronger IPR protection is
not surprising when viewed in the context of economic globalization,
which is the transcendent commercial and political force of this era.
Globalization is the process by which national and regional markets
become more tightly integrated through the reduction of governmen-
tal and natural barriers to trade, investment, and technology flows.5
In this global economy, the creation of knowledge and its adaptation
to product designs and production techniques are increasingly essen-
tial for commercial competitiveness and economic growth.6  But this
process acquires growing political saliency in light of the fact that the
international mobility of capital and technology has risen signifi-
cantly relative to that of most types of labor.7  Therefore, globaliza-
tion tends to reward creative and technically skilled workers and to
place its largest pressures on lower-skilled workers.8
When discussing globalization, it is important to distinguish be-
tween the mechanisms, the channels, and the outcomes.  The mecha-
nisms by which markets become more integrated include changes in
both natural forces and government policies.9  Key trends in natural
forces associated with various forms of technological changes consist
of reductions in international transportation costs, improvements in
global communications, and massive increases in computational
power permitted by the microprocessor.10  Equally important are
4. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE ROLE OF
THE WTO 59-64 (1998).
5. See Edward E. Leamer, A Trade Economist’s View of U.S. Wages and ‘Globalization’
1, 14 (Jan. 11, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
6.  See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Information Economy,
in POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 231, 234-60, (Thomas J. Courchene
ed., 1996).
7. See James R. Markusen, The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory
of International Trade, 9 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 169, 174; Keith E. Maskus & Guifang
Yang, Intellectual Property Rights, Foreign Direct Investment, and Competition Issues in Devel-
oping Countries, 17 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. (forthcoming 1999).
8. See ADRIAN WOOD, NORTH-SOUTH TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND INEQUALITY:
CHANGING FORTUNES IN A SKILL-DRIVEN WORLD  287-89 (1994); J. David Richardson, In-
come Inequality and Trade: How to Think, What to Conclude, 9 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1995,
at 33, 51-53.
9. Cf. Paul R. Krugman, Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 1995, at 337-343 (listing political factors, boundary issues, and
technological change as reasons for increased global integration).
10. See id; Edward E. Leamer, Foreigners and Robots: Assistants of Some, Competitors of
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changes in government policies that allow international firms greater
access to domestic markets.11  This improved market access has been
a central feature of policy making in many emerging economies in
the 1990s through both unilateral policy reform and adherence to re-
gional and multilateral trade agreements.12
The channels through which globalization affects economies in-
clude expanded trade in merchandise and services, product and tech-
nology licensing, greater international portfolio investment, and for-
eign direct investment (FDI).13  FDI, the establishment or acquisition
of production subsidiaries abroad by multinational enterprises
(MNEs), is particularly important because it is a source of capital and
knowledge about production techniques.14
In truth, these channels are responses to globalization, but, at
least in the public eye, are generally viewed as detrimental to the ul-
timate outcomes of the process.15  These outcomes include, in the first
instance, stronger tendencies toward arbitrage of international prices
of goods and tradable services and greater access by consumers and
firms in each liberalizing country to new and more varied products
and technologies on international markets.16  In turn, those initial
outcomes result in stronger competition, reductions in domestic mar-
ket power of formerly concentrated industrial concerns, re-allocation
of economic resources into areas of greatest comparative advantage,
declining production costs in sectors with increasing returns to scale,
and contraction or elimination of uncompetitive firms.17  This last re-
Others, 4-5 (April 5, 1998) (unpublished manuscript presented at Conference on Social Dimen-
sions of U.S. Trade Policies, on file with Maskus).
11. Such changes are, for example, trade liberalization, deregulation of investment and
licensing restrictions, provision of establishment rights in services, privatization of state-owned
enterprises, adoption of freely-traded currencies, and tax reform.  See generally JOHN WEISS,
ECONOMIC POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE REFORM AGENDA (1995).
12. See THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-2, 125-26 (Will Mar-
tin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1996) [hereinafter THE URUGUAY ROUND].
13. See Keith E. Maskus, The International Regulation of Intellectual Property, Band 134
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIVE [REV. OF WORLD ECON.] 186, 186 (1998); Markusen, su-
pra note 7, at 170, 171; RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 25 (2d ed. 1996); PETER J. BUCKLEY & MARK CASSON, THE ECONOMIC THEORY
OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 113-44 (1985).
14. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 173-75.
15. See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 8-9 (3d ed. 1995).
16. See THE WORLD BANK, Integration with the Global Economy, in WORLD DE-
VELOPMENT REPORT 88, 88-90, 103-08 (1991).
17. See JAMES R. MARKUSEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
105, 181-86 (1995); THE WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC MIRACLE 82, 302, 316-20
(1993); David Greenaway, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, 52 EUR. ECON. 103, 112-14
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sult, what economists label “firm exit,” is a key source of efficiency
gains in liberalizing economies, but it also leads to strong political
forces against deregulation.18
Over the long term, stronger competitive forces encourage adop-
tion of frontier technologies and the development of high-quality, dif-
ferentiated products for both domestic and export markets.19  Meet-
ing rigorous quality demands is particularly important to break into
export markets,20 and a key component of innovation and product
adaptation.21  Stronger, liberalized markets lead to permanently
higher growth rates, which explains why countries with outward-
oriented commercial policies have outperformed other developing
economies in recent decades.22
While there is considerable evidence to support this optimistic
view of globalization, such gains do not come without potential costs.
Foremost among these costs is that greater competition changes the
demand for labor in each country, with unskilled workers bearing the
brunt of competitive pressures through declining real wages or rising
unemployment.23  Also important are potential abuses of market
power to the extent that international firms are placed in a position
of market dominance by virtue of their marketing advantages or
technological superiority, although the likelihood of such abuses di-
minishes with stronger international competition.24
This brief review of globalization suggests that emerging coun-
tries should have strong and growing interests in attracting trade,
FDI, and technological expertise.  However, such interests must be
tempered and supported by accompanying programs to build local
skills and to ensure that the benefits of globalization actually occur.
Such broader programs should include 1) promoting political stability
(1993).
18. See Richard G. Harris, Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of Small Open Econo-
mies with Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1016, 1026-27
(1984); STEPHAN HAGGARD & STEVEN WEBB, VOTING FOR REFORM 18-20 (Stephan Haggard
& Steven Webb eds., 1994).
19. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 90.
20. This is supported by recent experiences in Chile, Mexico, Columbia, Morocco, and
Turkey.  See INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MICRO PATTERNS OF
TURNOVER, PRODUCTIVITY, AND MARKET STRUCTURE 9, 84-89, 202, 263, 287, 315 (Mark
Roberts & James Tybout eds., 1996)
21. See THE CHINA CIRCLE 13, 21 (Barry Naughton ed., 1997).
22. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at 37-38, 84-86.
23. See WOOD, supra note 8; Richardson, supra note 8.
24. See GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 20 (Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson
eds., 1998).
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and economic growth, 2) encouraging flexible labor markets and
building labor skills, 3) continued market liberalization, and 4) de-
veloping forward-looking regulatory regimes in services, investment,
intellectual property, and competition policy.  IPRs are an important
element of this broader policy designed to maximize the benefits of
expanded market access and to promote dynamic competition in
which local firms can meaningfully take part.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider each of these is-
sues and their complex interrelationships in detail.  Rather, this Arti-
cle focuses on issues of attracting FDI and technology, with a par-
ticular emphasis on the role of IPRs in this process.  The first section
gives an overview of recent trends in international investment and li-
censing, using U.S. data as a particular illustration.  The second sec-
tion then analyzes the main determinants of FDI, both in theory and
according to available economic evidence.  A similar treatment is
provided for licensing.  The third section discusses, from the stand-
point of an emerging economy, the potential benefits and costs of in-
coming FDI and technology transfer, focusing on issues of informa-
tion spillovers and diffusion.  Throughout, the impact of IPRs is
considered.  With this background, the fourth section presents the
broad outlines of a competitive strategy for attracting investment and
technology.  Inevitably, such strategies vary somewhat across coun-
tries by level of economic development and technological capability,
but there are important common denominators.  The final section
concludes with observations on the role of IPRs in linking developing
countries to an information-based global economy.
II.  DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
MNEs have several ways to serve foreign markets.  Firms may
choose simply to export at arm’s-length to a particular country or re-
gion.25  Alternatively, they may decide to undertake FDI, which re-
quires selecting where to invest and in what kind of facilities, whether
to purchase existing operations or construct new plants (so-called
“greenfield investments”), which production techniques to pursue,
and how large an equity position to take with potential local part-
ners.26  Sometimes, firms may prefer a joint venture with some de-
25. See Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, How Trade-Related are Intellectual Property
Rights?, J. INT’L ECON., Nov. 1995, at 227, 229-30.
26. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 173; CAVES, supra note 13, at 77-78.
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fined share of input costs, technology provision, and profits or losses,
especially in unknown or regulated markets, for example, China.27
Finally, MNEs may opt to license a technology, product, or service,
leading to complicated issues of bargaining over license fees and roy-
alty payments.28
For any firm, the decision of how to invest depends on a host of
complex factors regarding local markets and regulations.29  This sec-
tion discusses the most significant of these factors for attracting FDI,
(for example licensing and technology transfer) and reviews the
available economic evidence.  IPRs play an important role in these
processes, though their importance varies by industry and market
structure.
A. Review of Data on Foreign Direct Investment Flows
It is helpful to begin with a glance at recent international data on
FDI and licensing.30  Table 1 lists aggregate figures on FDI for repre-
sentative nations.  One immediate observation is that reported FDI is
quite volatile.31  For example, while inward FDI into the United
States remained fairly steady at between $48 billion and $60 billion
between 1987 and 1995, outward FDI more than tripled from 1990 to
1995.  Japan’s outward FDI rose sharply in the late 1980s, but fell by
more than half between 1990 and 1995.
Despite this volatility, the data shows sharply rising FDI flows in
the last decade for both the developed countries and most of the key
developing countries.32  Spain experienced a dramatic increase in in-
ward FDI in the late 1980s after its accession to the European Union,
but this inflow has since moderated.  The United Kingdom continues
27. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 170; CAVES, supra note 13, at 77-78.
28. See Guifang Yang & Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights, Licensing, and
Innovation 12-16 (April 5, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Ashish Arora,
Contracting for Tacit Knowledge: the Provision of Technical Services in Technology Licensing
Contracts, 50 J. DEV. ECON. 233, 234-38 (1996); FAROK J. CONTRACTOR, INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: COMPENSATION, COSTS, AND NEGOTIATION 33-51 (1980).
29. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 173-74; Maskus, supra note 13, at 189-93.
30. Reliable and comprehensive data on these flows are not compiled by many countries,
so the overview is constrained by limited data availability.
31. This volatility suggests that one should be cautious about making inferences on the
basis of a single year of data.  Further, it indicates that FDI flows are strongly influenced in the
short term by macroeconomic factors, such as fluctuations in the business cycle and shifts in
exchange rates.  While this fact should be kept in mind, the Article is more concerned with mi-
croeconomic determinants of FDI.
32. These figures are in nominal dollars and are not adjusted for inflation or changes in
real exchange rates.
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to be a net supplier of FDI, but annual investment in that country has
doubled over the period.  Japan remains, in relation to its GNP, a
very small recipient of inward FDI, but a large supplier of outward
FDI.33  Poland’s rapid liberalization and deregulation program and its
increasing commercial ties with Western Europe led to a forty-fold
increase in inward FDI in the early 1990s.
As is well known, FDI in China has mushroomed in recent years,
rising by a factor of ten between 1990 and 1995.  China received 52%
of the inward FDI in 1995 among the listed developing countries, a
share that rose dramatically from 15% in 1990.34  Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Thailand have also received rising inward FDI flows.  In the
1990s, Thailand’s investment abroad rose sharply and Singapore be-
came a significant supplier of FDI.
The two listed African countries, Kenya and Egypt, both dis-
played declining trends in inward FDI over the last decade, indicative
of severe economic problems on that continent.  In contrast, Mexico
experienced a sharp rise in FDI in the 1990s, some of it undoubtedly
related to the negotiation and passage of NAFTA.  Brazil and Chile
similarly received large increases in FDI since 1990.
From this review it appears that the last decade has been a pe-
riod of substantially rising FDI, with a larger proportion of invest-
ment flowing to the emerging economies.  The one “dark spot” on
this trend is the declining ability of very poor and inward-looking
economies, such as those in Africa, to attract investment.  Overall,
the review points to rapid growth and increasing openness as the key
encouraging factors.
Table 2 provides figures on net receipts35 for royalties and li-
censing fees, other business services, and direct investment income.
Royalties and license fees are the most direct available measure of
international earnings on patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade
secrets.36  Among the developed nations, the data indicates a split.
33. It is this feature, Japan’s remarkable effective closure to inbound FDI, that continues
to characterize it as unique among developed economies.
34. China’s receipt of nearly $36 billion in FDI in 1995 marks it as easily the largest desti-
nation for investment in the developing world.
35. Meaning credits less debits.
36. This is a standard view in economics.  It should be noted that these fees could be im-
perfect measures of the value of technology exchange.  See Keith E. Maskus, Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights, 52 EUR. ECON. 157, 158-59, 163 (1993).  Within the multinational
firm, the fees charged a subsidiary may be dependent on international tax structures. See
Denise Eby Konan, Strategic Taxation of the Multinational Enterprise: A New Argument for
Double Taxation, 63 J. PUB. ECON. 301, 303 (1997).  Further, optimal pricing of information is
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The United States remains, by far, the largest recipient of such fees,
earning a net $20.7 billion in 1995.  The United Kingdom is also a net
recipient, signaling a net export of technologies and product designs.
In contrast, Japan, Germany, and Spain pay out more in royalties and
fees than they take in, indicating they are net purchasers of technolo-
gies and product designs.  Furthermore, the developing countries, as
technology importers, are all net purchasers of royalties and license
fees.  Interestingly, for almost all those developing countries,37 the net
payments have risen markedly over the last decade.  Thus, it appears
the international exploitation of intellectual property is becoming in-
creasingly important in the globalization process.
Table 3 lists the stock of U.S.-owned foreign capital38 for key
countries.39  The top row demonstrates that U.S. ownership of foreign
direct capital nearly tripled from 1985 to 1994.40  Despite the increas-
ing attractiveness of developing economies as investment targets, the
bulk of U.S. investment remained in the developed countries.  The
twelve countries of the European Union actually increased their
share of U.S. investment stock from 36% to 41% over this period,
while Japan’s share rose from 4% to 6%.  Surprisingly, by 1994 the
United Kingdom had supplanted Canada as the host of the largest
U.S. foreign investment position, with Canada’s share falling consid-
erably over the period.  Together Europe, Canada and Japan at-
tracted 66.9% of the global U.S. foreign capital stock in 1994.  But
because each country or region listed saw a large increase in the U.S.-
owned capital stock, with the exception of Africa, it is likely that re-
cent relative increases in investment will change these shares over
time in favor of the emerging economies.41
Within the developing countries, however, the distribution of
FDI remains uneven.  In the 1990s, China’s share of U.S. FDI tripled
and investment stock in Hong Kong doubled.  Mexico’s share also
rose sharply, which likely is partly a result of NAFTA—as did
Chile’s.  In contrast, Africa experienced an absolute decline in in-
a complex problem and receipts of license fees and investment income may be poor indicators
of the economic value of intellectual assets.  Nonetheless, these data are worth considering.
See Maskus, supra, at 163.
37. With the possible exception of India.
38. Meaning foreign investment position at historical cost.
39. The foreign investment position is a more informative measure of investment activity
than is current FDI, because the latter flow is so variable.
40. Because these data are in nominal dollars at historical cost, they should be viewed with
caution.
41. See BRIAN J.L. BERRY ET AL., THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 382 (1997).
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vestment stock over the period, indicating a sizable disinvestment,
with its share falling from 2.6% to 0.9%.
This uneven development was particularly acute in the 1980s.42
In that decade, a total of fifteen countries received 80% of all FDI in-
flows to the developing areas.43  These flows were highly concentrated
within regions as well.  For example, Singapore, China, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand absorbed more
than 90% of investments in Asian developing countries over the dec-
ade.44  While this concentration has moderated somewhat in the
1990s, it is still in evidence.
Table 4 points to another important feature of FDI in today’s
economy: much investment is complementary across sectors. The
data shows that the global stock of capital in banking and finance is
nearly as large as that in total manufacturing, and that investments in
wholesale trade are also significant.  This demonstrates that a strong
manufacturing presence in a foreign economy typically goes hand-in-
hand with investments in finance and distribution in order to help
with local marketing efforts and in financing further expansion of fa-
cilities.  Such investments are also strongly complementary with mer-
chandise trade flows, particularly those within MNEs.  Thus, the tra-
ditional view that FDI tends to substitute for trade in goods, that is
that trade falls as FDI and local production rise, is outdated and
largely inaccurate today.45
The bottom two rows in Table 4 crudely indicate the breakdown
of the sectoral investment into stocks in developed and developing
countries.  The manufacturing sector with the highest representation
in emerging economies is electrical equipment, followed by food and
related products and other manufacturing goods.  These industries
are those in which it could be expected that developing economies
with low-wage labor and abundant agricultural endowments have a
comparative advantage in important subsectors.46  The chemicals sec-
tor should also have a fairly high presence in emerging economies,
42. See Hooshang Amirahmadi & Weiping Wu, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing
Countries, 28 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 167, 168 (1994).
43. See id. at 173.
44. See id.
45. See James R. Markusen, Factor Movements and Commodity Trade as Complements, 14
J. INT’L ECON. 341, 355 (1983); Kar-yiu Wong, Are International Trade and Factor Mobility
Substitutes?, 21 J. INT’L ECON. 25, 26 (1986); Bruce A. Blonigen, In Search of Substitution Be-
tween Foreign Production and Exports 1-3 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
46. See MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 100-02.
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particularly in the pharmaceuticals sub-sector.47  The data in Table 4
confirms this, with chemicals having the largest stock among sectors
investing in China and also being prominent in Latin America.  The
data thus shows that FDI between the United States and developing
countries tends to follow comparative advantages based on factor
costs.48
The banking and finance sectors have a large presence in devel-
oping economies—38% of their FDI stocks are located there.  But
much of this investment is in Panama and Bermuda because of spe-
cial tax and operating advantages, indicating that some forms of FDI
are sensitive to regulatory regimes.49  Without Panama and Bermuda,
the data suggests that 77% of FDI in these sectors is based more on
long-term microeconomic factors existing in the developed countries.
Investment in services sectors (largely hotels, engineering and busi-
ness services) is heavily located in developed economies.  However, a
substantial portion (25%) of investment in wholesale trade activities
exists in developing economies, reflecting the complementary rela-
tionship between finance and distribution, on the one hand, and trade
and FDI in goods, on the other hand.  It should be noted that services
bear the particular characteristic that their provision often physically
requires the local presence of either the facility itself (hotels, hospi-
tals) or of professionals (engineers, consultants).  Thus, rights of es-
tablishment are especially important in attracting FDI in services.
Table 5, which lists data on U.S. investment abroad by high-
technology manufacturing and services industries in 1989, provides
further perspective on the sectoral characteristics of FDI.  First, there
exists significant variation across industries in the number of foreign
affiliates per U.S. parent, which indicates the relative importance of
investing in either numerous foreign subsidiaries of fairly small size
or fewer foreign facilities of larger size.  The pharmaceuticals indus-
try tops this list with 33.8 affiliates per firm.  Pharmaceuticals are
47. See Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 25, at 238, 242-43.
48. See David Carr et al., Testing the Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational En-
terprise 22-23 (July 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Journal of Compara-
tive & International Law); CAVES, supra note 13, at 215-17.  A similar finding for U.K. invest-
ment was detected by Maskus and Webster.  See Keith E. Maskus & Allan Webster,
Comparative Advantage and the Location of Inward Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from
the UK and South Korea, 18 WORLD ECON. 315, 320-23 (1995).
49. See Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Taxes, Tariffs, and Transfer Pricing in Multinational
Corporate Decision Making, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 285, 288-290 (1991); U.N. CONFERENCE
ON TRADE AND DEV., INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT at 18-26, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DTCI/28, U.N. Sales No. E.96.II.A.6 (1996) [hereinafter UNCTAD, INCENTIVES].
MASKUSFINAL2.DOC 04/02/99  2:30 PM
1998] THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 119
characterized by having large numbers of foreign affiliates producing
under license.50  Advertising and industrial chemicals are next, with
other industries trailing behind.  Second, the stock of foreign assets
owned by U.S. firms is shown again to be sparsely located in emerg-
ing countries (ECs).  The highest proportions of investment in ECs
are in electric components and circuits and telecommunications
equipment.  Each of these sectors includes considerable electronics
production that is fairly standardized and labor-intensive.51  Health
services are unusually high in this context among the service sectors.
Third, the proportion of intra-firm sales, which are largely between
the parent and its affiliates, differs considerably across industries.  In
comparison to the stock of foreign assets, intra-firm trade is quite
high in electronic components, office machines and computers, and
motor vehicles and parts.  This situation reflects substantial trade in
inputs among vertically differentiated firms.  Intra-firm trade is much
smaller in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and printing and publishing, in
which MNEs tend to be horizontally integrated.  Unsurprisingly,
there is virtually no intra-firm trade in high-technology services,
which essentially requires direct contact between supplier and cus-
tomer.
B. Factors Influencing Foreign Direct Investment Flows
Foreign direct investment is the act of establishing or acquiring a
foreign subsidiary over which the investing firm has substantial man-
agement control.52  Firms that engage in FDI operate in more than
one country and are MNEs.  The location of the firm headquarters is
called the home or source country, while the location of the subsidi-
ary is called the host or recipient country.53  However, it is increas-
ingly difficult to identify major MNEs with a particular host country,
since they may establish facilities in several countries that each un-
dertake “headquarters operations” (such as research and develop-
ment, marketing, and organizational design) for local markets and
tax jurisdictions.54
50. See Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 25, at 238, 242-43.
51. See THE CHINA CIRCLE, supra note 21, at 11-17.
52. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 1.
53. See MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 4.
54. The BASF corporation, for example, was originally identified with Germany, but has
moved much of its cancer and immune-system research to Massachusetts.  See MICHAEL R.
CZINKOTA ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 355 (1994). Otis Elevator recently designed an
elevator using six research centers in five countries.  See id.
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Multinational enterprises may undertake horizontal FDI, in
which the subsidiary produces products and services similar to those
produced at home,55 or vertical FDI, in which the subsidiary produces
inputs or undertakes assembly from components.56  In the latter case,
international production is fragmented across borders, taking advan-
tage of locational considerations and input costs (especially wage dif-
ferences) at various stages of production.57  Vertical FDI is more
prevalent among MNEs that invest in developing (low-wage) econo-
mies, while horizontal FDI tends to characterize the investment deci-
sions of MNEs operating across borders within the industrialized, de-
veloped nations.58  Horizontal subsidiaries tend to produce for local
or regional markets only, without exporting much output to the host
country.59  In contrast, the output of vertical subsidiaries is more
likely to be exported within MNEs, both to the host country and to
other countries with similar demand characteristics.60
It is also important to note that FDI embodies two distinctive as-
sets: 1) capital and 2) technology or some intangible advantage.61
While the capital for financing FDI may come from the host country
or from global financial markets, it may also be raised on the local
capital markets of the recipient nation.62  Thus, FDI may or may not
be associated with a net external addition to the local capital stock,
although in economic terms this should be of little consequence since
it is investment itself that matters, whether raised from domestic or
foreign sources.  Therefore, FDI should be viewed less as a source of
finance.63  Instead it should be seen as a source of investment in capi-
tal and technology or related assets, the variables capable of im-
proving productivity and wages in a recipient economy.64
55. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 2.
56. See id. at 13.
57. See id. at 47, 217-19.
58. See id. at 7-8, 15-16.
59. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 174-75.
60. See Gordon H. Hanson, Localization Economies, Vertical Organization, and Trade, 86
AM. ECON. REV. 1266, 1266 (1996).
61. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 174-75.
62. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 64-71; MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 394-95.
Raising the capital on the local market is the most common approach for financing horizontal
investments among industrialized nations.  See CAVES, supra note 13, at 65-71; MARKUSEN ET
AL., supra note 17, at 394-95.  External financing more commonly characterizes FDI in emerg-
ing countries.  See MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 394-95.
63. This is even more so, as global FDI flows are small in relation to flows of portfolio
capital.
64. See INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MICRO PATTERNS OF
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What are the underlying determinants of a firm’s decision to en-
gage in FDI?  Generally, for firms to become a MNE, they must have
a cost advantage or technical product superiority over firms in the
host country sufficient to overcome the disadvantages they face.65
Thus, MNEs must enjoy some efficiency advantages, meaning that
they bring potential gains to host countries.  A convenient framework
to illustrate those advantages is the ownership-location-
internalization (OLI) paradigm.66  Under the OLI paradigm, MNEs
are characterized by some ownership advantage.  While this could be
a tangible asset, such as a proprietary claim in facilities producing key
natural resources, far more commonly the advantage is an intangible
asset, such as a trademark, reputation for quality, a product or pro-
duction process to which other firms do not have access—such as a
patent or trade secret.67  Such advantages confer market power and
cost efficiencies that provide sufficient incentives to undertake multi-
national organization and operation.
These ownership advantages are strongly associated with tech-
nology development, information management, and marketing
strategies due to certain key attributes of MNEs.68  These characteris-
tics include: the tendency of such firms to be important in industries
with high levels of research and development (R&D); large employ-
ment of professional and technical workers; significant reliance on
the introduction of new and technically sophisticated products; and
substantial product differentiation and advertising.69  For two key
reasons, FDI70 is more likely to be important in industries with sig-
nificant firm-specific, intangible, knowledge-based assets (KBAs).71
TURNOVER, PRODUCTIVITY, AND MARKET STRUCTURE, supra note 20, at 185.
65. These difficulties include, for example, the need for  international management, in-
cluding language and cultural barriers, jurisdiction-specific tax treatments, distance from head-
quarters, and monitoring local operations.  See STEPHEN H. HYMER, THE INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL FIRMS: A STUDY OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 32-36 (1976);
CAVES, supra note 13, at 3-5; Markusen, supra note 7, at 174-75.
66. This paradigm was developed by Dunning.  See JOHN H. DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCTION AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 110, 113 (1981).
67. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 174-75.
68. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 3-5.  For further studies supporting these points, see gen-
erally S. Lael Brainard, An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Tradeoff
Between Multinational Sales and Trade, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 520 (1993); Stephen G. Grubaugh,
Determinants of Direct Foreign Investment, 69 REV. ECON. STAT. 149 (1987); Markusen, supra
note 7; and Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, The Quality of Licensed Technology, 33 INT’L. J.
IND. ECON. 41 (1992).
69. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 172; Brainard, supra note 68, at 538.
70. Remember that by definition FDI is only done by MNEs.
71. For example, such KBAs include superior production processes, reputations for qual-
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First, information advantages can easily be transferred across borders
at low cost.72  Second, knowledge is similar to a public good; unlike
labor or capital, a particular technology or trade secret can be used in
several production facilities without reducing its availability for oth-
ers.73  This knowledge is embodied in blueprints, software, chemical
formulas, and managerial or engineering manuals, which may be re-
used repeatedly at low marginal cost.74
The key implication of these characteristics of KBAs is that
MNEs enjoy scale economies from multiplant production, sometimes
called “economies of scope”.75  A multinational firm can produce
technical knowledge in one location and apply it at plants in different
countries, spreading the investment cost of technology development
and marketing across numerous facilities.76  In contrast, two inde-
pendent firms, each of which must make this same investment, oper-
ate at a cost disadvantage.  Thus, significant multinational activity can
be seen in industries where the development of transferable knowl-
edge and product quality is a prime goal.  Potential for capitalizing on
multiplant economies is now considered one of the most important
determinants of a firm’s decision to undertake FDI.77
Efficiency gains are particularly relevant for horizontal FDI, in
which firms base their strategies for penetrating markets on the eco-
nomic value of their KBAs.  Because economic value is increasingly
related to the performance of systems, MNEs also find it crucial to
support their investments with complementary operations such as
add-on products, services, information, maintenance, technical up-
grades, and close relations between producers and clients.78  There-
fore, in today’s world, FDI is far less attracted by protectionist tariff
walls than by economies with open access to global markets and
strong IPRs.79
To summarize, MNEs are essentially exporters of KBA, includ-
ing technology, engineering, management, marketing, and financial
ity, performance and service, and even lifestyle images.  See CAVES, supra note 13, at 3-5; Mar-
kusen, supra note 7, at 174.
72. See James R. Markusen, Multinationals, Multiplant Economics, and the Gains from
Trade, 16 J. INT’L  ECON. 205, 207-08 (1984); Markusen, supra note 7, at 174.
73. See Markusen, supra note 72, at 207-08; Markusen, supra note 7, at 174.
74. See Markusen, supra note 72, at 207-08; Markusen, supra note 7, at 174.
75. See Markusen, supra note 72, at 207-08; Markusen, supra note 7, at 174.
76. See Markusen, supra note 72, at 206.
77. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 175.
78. See THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 12, at 389-90.
79. See id.
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services.  Human capital skills are important in generating these
KBAs.  Multinational firms also sell the services of devices that pro-
tect the value of their KBAs, including patents, trademarks, trade se-
crets, and copyrights.  Indeed, it is common for economists to refer to
owned IPRs as the relevant knowledge-based assets.80  Local subsidi-
aries pay for these services with royalties, license fees, shared out-
puts, and profit repatriations.81
But even with ownership advantages, MNEs must still decide on
investment destinations.  These decisions depend on “location advan-
tages,” particular characteristics of target countries that make it
profitable for the firm to produce abroad rather than at home.82  Ob-
vious examples of such location advantages include market size and
growth, local demand patterns, transport costs and distance from
markets, low wage costs in relation to labor productivity, abundant
natural resources, and trade protection that could encourage “tariff-
jumping” investments.83  Also important are a modern infrastructure
and transparent government regulatory procedures.84  Recently, these
KBA-enhancing location characteristics have taken on crucial impor-
tance.85  Among these attributes are an adequate supply of high-
skilled labor that can absorb and use new technology and manage-
ment techniques,86 close proximity to customers, an unimpeded abil-
ity to build supplier-customer networks, and a vibrant business-
services sector that can handle localized needs for marketing and fi-
nance.87  Further, the strength of each country’s IPRs is a locational
80. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 175.
81. See id.; CONTRACTOR, supra note 28, at 33-37; Arora, supra note 28, at 236.
82. See DUNNING, supra note 66, at 266-68; Markusen, supra note 7, at 175-81.
83. Trade protection, however, declines in importance over time.  See MARKUSEN ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 346-49.
84. Infrastructure investments include public projects that lower transport and communi-
cations costs such as roads, port facilities, and telecommunications linkages. Education is im-
portant for raising the technical skills of the population.  Such investments provide inducements
for multinational enterprises to expand to countries where costs are accordingly lower.  See
THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994: INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DE-
VELOPMENT 14-20 (1994).  Government regulations are “transparent” in that they are codified,
enforceable, well-understood, and not subject to abuses and corruption.  Regulatory transpar-
ency also lowers the costs of investing and producing in a particular location, attracting foreign
direct investment.  See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE
IN A CHANGING WORLD 36-38, 99, 134 (1997) [hereinafter WORLD BANK 1997]; BERRY, ET
AL., supra note 41, at 10, 268; UNCTAD, INCENTIVES, supra note 49, at 42.
85. See Brainard, supra note 68, at 539; MARYANN P. FELDMAN, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
INNOVATION 18-21 (1994); UNCTAD, INCENTIVES, supra note 49, at 17-19.
86. See FELDMAN, supra note 85, at 18-21.
87. See Brainard, supra note 68, at 539.
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factor of growing importance.88
If location advantages are important for horizontal FDI, they are
crucial for vertical FDI.  In a vertical FDI regime, firms build produc-
tion networks across borders with engineering, design, and marketing
operations remaining in the source country and resource extraction,
assembly, and data processing established in the host countries.89  The
construction of such vertically integrated networks, also referred to
as “production fragmentation,” “delocalization,” or “outsourcing,”90
is the most significant recent trend in FDI.  This process underlies the
rapid expansion of intrafirm trade in goods and services between de-
veloped and developing economies.91  Vertical FDI is most attractive
in low-wage, high-growth economies with sufficiently large markets
to take advantage of scale economies in assembly.92  While these pro-
duction networks may threaten low-skilled workers in high-wage
economies, they generate overall efficiency gains in both the source
and host countries and are therefore a critical component of modern
competitive strategies.93
In this context, it is interesting to observe that both the volume
and character of inward FDI change dramatically as countries de-
velop.94  The least-developed countries of the world attract virtually
no FDI (except in extractive sectors) due to extremely low produc-
tivity, education, and skills.95  Other factors hurting those countries
88. Survey evidence points to multinational enterprises placing more importance on IPRs
in deciding on FDI programs.  See EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRO-
TECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 19-21 (International
Fin. Corp. Discussion Paper 19, 1994); Maskus, supra note 13, at 192-93; Jeong-Yeon Lee &
Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment, 78 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 181, 185-86 (1996).
89. See Hanson, supra note 60, at 1277 (analyzing effects of trade liberalization on Mexi-
can apparel industry); see also BERRY ET AL., supra note 41, at 234-38.
90. Hanson, supra note 60, at 1277; BERRY ET AL., supra note 41,.
91. Examples include the extensive fragmentation of electronics and machinery produc-
tion into design in the United States and assembly in the maquiladora plants in Mexico.  See
Hanson, supra note 60, at 1266-67.  Similar processes characterize investment and trade by
Japanese and Korean multinationals in East Asia.  See THE CHINA CIRCLE, supra note 21, at
211.
92. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 17-18; THE CHINA CIRCLE, supra note 21, at 165.
93. See MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 395-96, 400-01, 406; Kevin H. Zhang, Theory
and Evidence Regarding Multinational Enterprises and International Trade 59-64, 91-93 (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado (Boulder)) (on file with author).
94. See Zhang, supra note 93, at 62-64, 166.
95. See Zhang, supra note 93, at 16, 166; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/1, U.N. Sales No. 96.II.D.10 (1997) [hereinafter UNCTAD, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT].
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are underdeveloped infrastructures, relatively closed markets, and
poorly designed, intrusive, and non-transparent government regula-
tions that encourage corruption.96  To the extent that these countries
can marshal effective investments in infrastructure, capital, educa-
tion, and skills, their per-capita income levels will rise over time.97  As
income levels rise, MNEs find these economies attractive locations
for vertical FDI for labor-intensive assembly operations and intra-
firm trade grows.98  This process expands until real wages rise to the
extent that the economies lose their competitive advantages in as-
sembly production, the FDI itself playing a positive role in raising
wages.99  As vertical FDI begins to fall off, horizontal FDI takes its
place.  By this stage of the cycle, the host countries achieve income
levels high enough to make them attractive markets for the produc-
tion of high-quality, differentiated consumer and capital goods and
even for the establishment of local R&D programs.100  Rapidly devel-
oping economies, such as Korea, Singapore, and Mexico, may move
through this investment cycle in a single generation.101
Key location characteristics for horizontal MNEs include market
size, income level and growth, transport costs, complementary busi-
ness services and regulations, and market openness.102  As noted ear-
lier, IPRs take on increasing importance as investment becomes more
horizontal in nature.  It is therefore not surprising that a country
moving through the FDI cycle, from vertical to horizontal FDI, has a
growing economic interest in adopting stronger IPRs—an interest
congruent with its own expanding abilities to develop new products
and technologies.
But ownership and location advantages do not fully explain FDI
as they do not account for the advantages of internal organization
over selling goods and licensing technologies on the open market.
96. See Zhang, supra note 93, at 65-66; WORLD BANK 1997, supra note 84, at 36-38.
97. See Zhang, supra note 93, at 93-94.
98. See id. at 65-66, 91, 165.
99. See id. at 65-66, 91, 166.
100. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 178; JAMES R. MARKUSEN ET AL., A UNIFIED
TREATMENT OF HORIZONTAL DIRECT INVESTMENT, VERTICAL DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND
THE PATTERN OF TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 17-18 (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 5696, 1996).  While horizontal FDI displaces vertical FDI, the cumulative
stock of FDI nevertheless should rise over time.  Thus, there is an important dynamic element
to growth and investment.  This process is summarized schematically in Figure 1.
101. For an econometric analysis of the FDI cycle, see Carr et al., supra note 48, at 7-8.
102. See Brainard, supra note 68, at 521; Carr et al., supra note 48, at 24-25; David Wheeler
& Ashoka Mody, International Investment Location Decisions: the Case of U.S. Firms, 33 J.
INT’L  ECON. 57, 71-72 (1992).
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MNEs also have internalization advantages, which relate to gains
from exploiting their KBAs within the confines of their international
operations.103  It is this aspect of the process that explains the decision
to acquire a subsidiary rather than to license an asset with an inde-
pendent foreign firm.
There are numerous reasons why the costs of international
transactions may be lower if performed by a subsidiary rather than at
arm’s-length.  Most of these relate to difficulties involved in writing
and enforcing contracts between independent firms where licensing is
costly and information is imperfect.  For example, because the poten-
tial subject of a licensing contract (the KBA) is valuable, but perhaps
easily copied, the original firm may not wish to reveal its technology
to an unrelated licensee during contract negotiations for fear the lat-
ter could decline the contract and copy the technology for its own
purposes.104  The licensee, on the other hand, would be unwilling to
sign a contract and agree to royalty terms unless it knows the par-
ticulars and value of the technology.105  In such cases, it may be im-
possible to develop a satisfactory and enforceable contract, forcing
the original firm to acquire a subsidiary to which it transfers the
KBAs.106  This is an informational imperfection in the market for
technology that implies, other things being equal, that firms would be
more likely to engage in FDI in countries with weaker IPRs and con-
tract-enforcement procedures.107  Another implication is that as IPRs
in a particular nation become stronger, firms tend to choose more
technology licensing and joint ventures and less FDI.108  This negative
association of stronger IPRs and reduced FDI applies most readily to
firms with proprietary technologies that are expensive to develop but
easily copied, such as pharmaceuticals, agricultural chemicals, and
computerized processes.  A similar phenomenon is that MNEs may
be more willing to train and retain technical and managerial employ-
ees who learn the technology and who might otherwise defect from a
103. See Alan M. Rugman, New Theories of the Multinational Enterprise: An Assessment of
Internalization Theory, 38 BULL. ECON. RESEARCH 101, 114-15 (1986).
104. See DAVID J. TEECE, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE RESOURCE
COST OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 27, 87 (1976); Markusen, supra note 7, at
182.
105. See TEECE, supra note 104, at 19-20; Markusen, supra note 7, at 182.
106. See TEECE, supra note 104, at 19-20.
107. See Ignatius Horstmann & James R. Markusen, Licensing Versus Direct Investment: A
Model of Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise, 20 CAN. J. ECON. 464, 471-74 (1987);
Maskus, supra note 13, at 196-99.
108. See Horstmann & Markusen, supra note 107, at 472; Maskus, supra note 13, at 197.
MASKUSFINAL2.DOC 04/02/99  2:30 PM
1998] THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 127
licensee and form their own competing firms.  An additional con-
tracting problem is that a potential independent licensee may attempt
to convince MNEs that the market is smaller than it really is, or will
grow to be, thereby limiting its royalties and fees.109  If there is wide
uncertainty on this point, MNEs may prefer FDI to avoid having to
share any potential profits.110  This situation explains why some firms
set up complementary foreign distribution and servicing facilities.111
FDI is prevalent in technology-intensive industries, such as those
mentioned above, in part because of technological transfer costs.112
MNEs usually incur higher transfer costs through arm’s-length trans-
actions because it is difficult to transfer qualities resident in the firm’s
human capital, management, know-how, and corporate culture.113
This factor increases in importance with more complicated technol-
ogy or management processes.  Because transfer costs also depend on
the recipient country’s ability to absorb the technology efficiently,
technology licensing in complicated products and processes should
increase as the human capital base of the host economy rises.114
Firms whose KBAs include their reputation for high quality,
have an additional motivation for FDI.  Once a contract is signed, lo-
cal licensees may not have sufficient incentive to maintain product or
service quality, tarnishing the original firm’s reputation and profit-
ability.115  Similarly, product quality may suffer with licensees who
shirk their marketing or distribution duties, or who sign contracts
109. This problem arises because the local licensee may have better intelligence about the
true size and characteristics of its home market (such as impending economic fluctuations, gov-
ernment policies, and consumer demand) than the foreign licensor.  Since the parties must bar-
gain over the terms of the licensing contract, the licensee has an incentive to under-represent
the true size and demand characteristics of its market in order to reduce its royalties and fees.
For its part, if the licensor is uncertain about the demand for its product and therefore cannot
strike an acceptable bargain over royalties and fees, it may prefer to internalize this uncertainty
by engaging in foreign direct investment and maintaining control over the technology and sales
operations.  This is a standard bargaining problem in contract theory.  See Markusen, supra
note 7, at 182-83; Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, Technology Transfer Under Asymmetric
Information, 21 RAND J. ECON. 147, 157 (1990).
110. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 182.
111. For an examination of the behavior of American and Japanese MNEs, see Eric D.
Ramstetter & William E. James, Transnational Corporations, Japan-United States Economic
Relations, and Economic Policy: The Uncomfortable Reality, TRANSNAT’L CORP., Dec. 1993, at
68-69 (1993).
112. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 8-9; Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Why Investors
Value Multinationality, 64 J. BUS. 165, 165-67 (1991); Markusen, supra note 7, at 172.
113. See TEECE, supra note 104, at 46-47.
114. See TEECE, supra note 104, at 49-55; MANSFIELD, supra note 88, at 19-20; CON-
TRACTOR, supra note 28, at 94-96.
115. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 183-84.
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with competitors, devoting more attention to their products.116  These
problems are most significant in economies where monitoring is
costly and difficult, the supply of technologies and products to licen-
sees is highly competitive, and contracts are not well enforced.117
While a firm can attempt to deter such behavior through careful con-
tract construction, it nevertheless may be easier to exercise control
through FDI.118
This analysis suggests strongly that internalization issues favor
FDI, especially horizontal FDI, in industries where KBAs are impor-
tant.  In such sectors, which tend to be associated with intensive
R&D programs, advertising efforts, and frequent introduction of
complex products,119 technology transfers are likely to be made inter-
nally within the firm, especially when there are contracting, moni-
toring, and enforcement difficulties.120
There are also internalization advantages for vertical FDI.
Largely, these advantages relate to difficulties in setting contract
prices when MNEs propose to purchase inputs or services, such as a
natural resource or assembly operation, from a single seller.121  In
markets where oligopolistic markets may exist on both sides of the
transaction, firms are likely to find it advantageous to integrate the
activities and establish profit-maximizing internal pricing.122
C. The Role of Intellectual Property Rights
This review of the determinants of FDI leaves room for IPRs to
affect investment flows and the operations of MNEs.  The various
means by which IPRs influence FDI are subtle and complex.  Moreo-
ver, it must be emphasized that strong IPRs alone do not sufficiently
generate strong incentives for firms to invest in a country.123  If that
116. See id.
117. See MANSFIELD, supra note 88, at 19-20; CONTRACTOR, supra note 28, at 136-37.
118. See Horstmann & Markusen, supra note 107, at 470-71.
119. See Morck & Yeung, supra note 112, at 167-68; Markusen, supra note 7, at 172.
120. See Horstmann & Markusen, supra note 107, at 467-71.
121. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 13-14; F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 299-302 (2d ed. 1980).
122. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 103-05; SCHERER, supra note 121, at 299-302.
123. Strong IPRs attract FDI, but are not sufficient for this purpose.  Several studies show
that a country hoping to attract FDI requires, among other factors, political and economic sta-
bility, adequate infrastructure, a strong educational system, a skilled labor force, and a large
market or proximity to markets.  See generally Wheeler & Mody, supra note 102 (studying in-
ter-government competition for foreign investment with tax and other short run incentives);
Grubert & Mutti, supra note 49 (studying the impact of host country taxes and tariffs on inter-
national trade patterns); Brainard, supra note 68 (finding that FDI increases relative to exports
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were the case, recent FDI flows to developing economies would have
gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe.124  In con-
trast, China, Brazil, and other high-growth, large-market developing
economies with weak IPRs would have attracted less FDI.125
IPRs are an important component of the general regulatory sys-
tem, including taxation, investment regulations, production incen-
tives, trade policies, and competition rules.  The joint implementation
of an overall pro-competitive business environment matters most for
FDI.  This section does not review the joint implementation, but fo-
cuses strictly on mechanisms by which the strength of IPRs affect
FDI decisions, in light of economists’ theories of why investment
takes place.
What ultimately matters to MNEs is the likelihood that FDI will
raise expected profits.126  Although numerous factors influence profit-
ability, the IPRs issue is the firm’s perception that it will be able to
earn a higher return on its protected KBAs through FDI, relative to
other means of earning such returns.127
The factors influencing a firm’s perception of profitability on its
KBAs through FDI is a complex subject that permits few definitive
conclusions.  To sketch an idea of this complexity, consider that a
the higher the transport costs and trade barriers and the lower the investment barriers and scale
economics at the plant level relative to the corporate level); Markusen, supra note 7 (focusing
on the circumstances that lead a firm to serve a foreign market by exports versus foreign pro-
duction and why firms choose FDI versus some alternative mode of entry, such as a joint ven-
ture or a licensing arrangement).
124. If IPRs alone were sufficient to attract FDI, FDI would have gone to many sub-
Saharan, African, and Eastern European economics where strong intellectual property laws are
poorly enforced.  See Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual
Property Protection in Developing Countries, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1990, at 77-83.  China,
Brazil, and other high-growth, large-market economies have weak intellectual property laws.
Yet, the former attract very little FDI because they are small and poor, whereas the latter at-
tract much FDI, because they are large and getting richer.  See id. (finding that sub-Saharan
and Eastern European countries have stronger intellectual property laws than China and Bra-
zil); Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 25, at 244; Juan Carlos Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Deter-
minants of Patent Rights: A Cross-National Study, 26 RES. POL’Y 283, 297-98 (1997) (presenting
an index of patent rights for 110 countries between 1960 and 1990 and analyzing the underlying
factors which influence patent protection levels).  That FDI avoids small, poor countries and
gravitates to large, growing countries was discussed in the context of Table 3 in this Article.
125. See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 124, at 77-83 (finding that sub-Saharan and Eastern
European countries have stronger intellectual property laws than China and Brazil); see also
Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 25, at 244; Ginarte & Park, supra note 124, at 297-98
(presenting an index of patent rights for 110 countries between 1960 and 1990 and analyzing
the underlying factors which influence patent protection levels).
126. See Stephen G. Grubaugh, Determinants of Direct Foreign Investment, 69 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 149, 149 (1986).
127. See Horstmann & Markusen, supra note 107, at 471; Maskus, supra note 13, at 197.
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firm with a KBA (reputation for quality, new technology, or a new
product) has several choices in deciding how to service a particular
foreign market.  First, it can export the goods through standard,
arm’s-length trade channels.  Second, it can choose to produce locally
by undertaking FDI and controlling the production process.  Third, it
can license or franchise its KBA to an unrelated firm in the host
country and allow local production in return for royalties and fees.
Finally, it can undertake a joint venture involving a form of joint
production or technology-sharing agreement.128  These decisions are
not made independently, and it is possible to observe more than one
mode of supply in certain circumstances.129
Exports are likely to be the primary mode of supply when trans-
port costs and tariffs are low in comparison to the costs of FDI and
licensing.130  But the volume of exports also depends on the strength
of local IPRs.131  Strong IPRs in all forms—patents, trademarks, copy-
rights, and trade secrets—provide protection for exporting firms
against local copying of the product, thereby increasing the potential
market for exporters and inducing them to sell more.132  This
“market-expansion effect” is likely to be strongest in countries with
large markets (either in absolute size or in terms of per-capita gross
national product (GNP) that have significant technical capabilities
for imitating products and technologies.133  At the same time, strong
IPRs give exporting firms greater market power, allowing them to
charge higher prices.  But concerns about this “monopoly effect” are
often overstated in light of competitive realities.134  It is more likely to
be important in countries with small markets and limited technologi-
cal abilities.  Overall, empirical evidence indicates that, other factors
being equal, countries with stronger IPRs attract more imports,
though the effect varies across industries.135  It is interesting to note
that the effect of stronger trademarks seems particularly important in
128. A further option—not supplying the market at all—may pertain to small, poor markets
with limited IPRs but is not considered further.
129. See Carr et al., supra note 48, at 7; Maskus, supra note 13, at 200.
130. See Carr et al., supra note 48, at 7; Markusen, supra note 7, at 173.
131. This point has been discussed most fully by Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 25, at 228.
132. See id. at 244.
133. See id.
134. See Keith E. Maskus & Denise Eby-Konan, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights:
Issues and Exploratory Results, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL
TRADING SYSTEM 411, 401-46 (Alan V. Deardoff & Robert M. Stern eds., 1994).
135. See Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 25, at 237-43.
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increasing exports136 of relatively low-technology goods, such as
clothing and other consumer goods, because the ease of knocking off
such products under weak trademarks limits foreign firms’ incentives
to sell them locally.137  Stronger trademarks effectively lower the costs
of exporting, because a firm faces a smaller need to discipline local
imitators through lower prices.138  Trade in goods that are difficult to
imitate (certain kinds of machinery), or for which trademarks are not
as significant (basic metal manufactures), is less sensitive to varia-
tions in IPRs since there is little threat of losing market share to local
infringing firms.139
FDI is likely to supplant direct exports of a good where trade
and transport costs are high,140 the fixed costs of building foreign
plants are low, local productivity is high, labor costs are low, the size
of the host market is large, and R&D and/or the marketing intensity
is substantial.141  As discussed earlier, R&D and marketing intensity
are critical for horizontal FDI in differentiated goods and advanced
technologies as it is the knowledge base—or intellectual compo-
nent—of the firm’s advantage that induces it to conduct FDI.
FDI exists because firms with some ownership advantage prefer
to exploit it through internal organization of multinational activity,
with the location of activity depending on local market characteris-
tics.  This analysis suggests that IPRs should take on different levels
of importance in different sectors with respect to encouraging FDI.
Investment in lower-technology goods and services, such as textiles
and apparel, electronic assembly, distribution, and hotels, depends
less on the strength of IPRs and relatively more on input costs and
market opportunities.142  Investors with a product or technology that
136. The term “export” means those exports from the source to the host country.  From the
host countries perspective those are imports.  However, because this Article focuses on the
MNE perspective, the term “export” is used.
137. See Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 25, at 244.
138. See id.; M. Scott Taylor, TRIPs, Trade, and Technology Transfer, 26 CAN. J. ECON.
625, 626-27 (1993).
139. See Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 25, at 230-31; RICHARD C. LEVIN ET AL.,
APPROPRIATING THE RETURNS FROM INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 796-97
(Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 3, 1987).
140. See Carr et al., supra note 48, at 7.  This is a relative comparison only.  Raising trade
barriers would not necessarily attract FDI; rather, high tariffs in relation to fixed costs are asso-
ciated with FDI.  In general, however, significant trade liberalization tends to attract FDI.
141. See id.; Brainard, supra note 68, at 520; JAMES R. MARKUSEN, TRADE VERSUS
INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION 2 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
6231, 1997).
142. See MANSFIELD, supra note 88, at 3-4 (finding that in relatively high-technology indus-
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is costly to imitate may also pay little attention to local IPRs in their
decision making.  However, the fact that imitation has become mark-
edly easier over time in many sectors points to the rising importance
of IPRs.143  Firms with easily copyable products and technologies,
such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food additives, and software, are
more concerned with the local IPR system’s ability to deter imita-
tion.144  Firms considering investing in a local R&D facility pay par-
ticular attention to local patent protection.
Reported surveys support the view that IPRs become more im-
portant as the ease of imitation increases.  One survey asked intellec-
tual-property executives in firms representing six industries about the
importance of IPRs in their FDI and licensing decisions.  They were
also asked to provide their assessments of the adequacy of IPRs in
sixteen countries.145  None of the industries showed much concern
about IPRs protecting the operation of sales and distribution outlets.
However, all sectors showed concern about IPRs protecting produc-
tion.  The level of concern increased with the stage of production.146
Overall, the chemical industry was the most affected in its decisions
to invest, but all sectors expressed strong concerns about local IPRs
in locating R&D operations.  Another survey demonstrated that
these findings also hold for Japanese and German firms considering
foreign investments.147
Table 7 presents additional results for selected countries with
weak IPRs at the time of the first survey.  In particular, firms ex-
pressed great concern over IPR protection in India.  Fully 80% of the
chemical firms surveyed indicated they did not feel they could engage
in joint ventures or transfer new technologies to subsidiaries or un-
related firms in India due to weak IPRs protection.  Interestingly, in
the chemical industry there is little difference between joint ventures
and subsidiaries in this regard.  Both investments evidently provide
foreign firms with approximately the same level of security for their
tries, a country’s IPRs system has a significant effect on the amount and kinds of investments
that foreign corporations will make).
143. See id. at 1.
144. See id. at 13.
145. See id. (surveying 100 major U.S. firms with international operations in 1991).  Table 6
reproduces the results regarding type of investment facility.
146. For example, in the chemical industry, which includes pharmaceuticals, 46% of firms
are concerned about protection for basic production and assembly facilities, 71% for compo-
nents manufacture, 87% for complete products manufacture, and 100% for R&D facilities.
147. See generally MANSFIELD, supra note 88 (finding that the strength or weakness of a
country’s IPRs effected investment decisions for Japanese and German firms).
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technologies.148  However, in all countries, licensing to unrelated firms
was seen as the riskest option because of weak IPRs.  This situation
seems to be true for machinery as well.  In the other sectors, how-
ever, there is little difference in the willingness to transfer technology
through various modes according to weaknesses in IPRs.
In countries with weak IPRs, licensing is seen as insecure relative
to investment in the high technology sectors.  This view illuminates a
subtle aspect of intellectual property protection.  In theory, firms are
more likely to undertake FDI than licensing when they have a com-
plex technology and highly differentiated products and when costs of
transferring technology through licensing are high.149  Under these
circumstances, it is more efficient to internalize the costs of technol-
ogy transfer through wholly-owned or majority-owned subsidiaries.150
As IPRs improve, licensing costs should fall as it becomes easier to
discipline licensees against revelation or appropriation of proprietary
technology and against misuse of a trademark.151  Thus, for a given
level of complexity of innovations, licensing should displace FDI as
IPRs are strengthened.
It is useful to summarize the previous observations about IPRs,
FDI, and technology transfer.  First, investment and technology
transfer are relatively insensitive to international differences in IPRs
in sectors with old products and standardized, labor-intensive tech-
nologies.  Here, FDI is influenced by factor costs, market sizes, trade
costs, and other location characteristics.  Second, other factors being
equal, for complex but easily copied technologies, FDI is likely to in-
crease as IPRs are strengthened.  The reason is that patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks increase the value of KBAs, which may be ef-
ficiently exploited through internalized organization.  Third, to the
extent that stronger IPRs reduce licensing costs, efficient licensing
could displace FDI over time.  Therefore, whatever the mode, the
likelihood that the most advanced technologies will be transferred
rises with the strength of IPRs.
One interesting implication of the fact that stronger IPRs in-
creases the likelihood that advanced technologies will be transferred
148. But there is more concern about joint ventures in Mexico and Indonesia.
149. See TEECE, supra note 104, at 19-20; William H. Davidson & Donald G. McFetridge,
Key Characteristics in the Choice of International Technology Transfer Mode J. INT’L BUS.
STUD., Summer 1985, at 5, 8; Horstmann & Markusen, supra note 107, at 465.
150. See Horstmann & Markusen, supra note 107, at 465; Davidson & McFetridge, supra
note 149, at 5, 8.
151. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 182-86; Maskus & Yang, supra note 7.
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is that rapidly growing, developing countries should develop a natural
interest in improving their IPRs regime as they increase their ability
to absorb and even develop more sophisticated innovations.  This is,
perhaps, the best argument in favor of adopting stronger IPRs pro-
tection for nations such as Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and Malaysia. 152  In
the early stages of their industrial growth, developing countries have
an interest in limited protection, because they want to be able to
freely imitate imported technologies.153  As they develop, however,
they should become increasingly interested in tightening IPRs, both
in order to attract the most advanced technologies and to encourage
their own innovation.154  This prediction is confirmed by the varying
degrees of patent protection across countries according to the level of
economic development.155
Economists cannot be entirely optimistic about the implications
of stronger IPRs for technology transfer.  Technological information
is transferred from one firm to another, or from one country to an-
other, through numerous channels.156  Patents themselves have poten-
tially ambiguous effects.  On the one hand, they directly facilitate ad-
ditional information transfer, and even technology diffusion, by
disclosing the details of inventions in application materials.157  Local
firms can use this information to develop follow-up products that do
not violate the scope of the original patent.  As more countries pro-
vide and enforce patents, global innovation and patenting should in-
crease, with a positive impact on follow-on innovation.  On the other
hand, patents can slow technology diffusion by limiting the use of key
technologies through restrictive licensing arrangements.  This nega-
tive view of patents has long been the policy of numerous developing
nations and still commands widespread respect in some quarters.158
152. See Robert E. Evenson, Intellectual Property Rights for Appropriate Invention, in THE
ECONOMICS OF COOPERATION: EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE CASE FOR PRO-
MARKET INTERVENTION 51, 66-73 (James A. Roumasset & Susan Barr eds., 1992).
153. See id. at 67.
154. See id. at 67-68.
155. See Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 25, at 240.
156. See Edwin Mansfield, How Rapidly Does Industrial Technology Leak Out?, 34 J.
INDUS. ECON. 217, 221 (1985); Jonathan Eaton & Samuel J. Kortum, Trade in Ideas: Patenting
and Productivity in the OECD, 40 J. INT’L  ECON. 251, 252 (1996); David Coe & Elhanan
Helpman, International R&D Spillovers, 39 EUR. ECON. REV. 859, 860 (1995); WOLFGANG
KELLER, TRADE AND THE TRANSMISSION OF TECHNOLOGY 3 (National Bureau of Econ. Re-
search Working Paper No. 6113, July 1997).
157. See UNCTAD, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 15; Eaton & Kortum, su-
pra note 156, at 260-1.
158. See Constantine Vaitsos, Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries, 9
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Recent theoretical growth models on the impact of IPRs on
technology diffusion also bear mixed messages.  In some models,
technology is transferred through imitation by firms in developing
countries.159 When the global IPRs system is strengthened by the
adoption of minimum standards, imitation becomes harder as foreign
patents are enforced.160  Thus, the rate of imitation declines.161  How-
ever, contrary to what might be expected, the global rate of innova-
tion slows as well.162  Innovation slows because it takes longer for
firms to lose their technological advantage.  Firms can therefore earn
higher profits per innovation and reduce their R&D efforts.163
The idea that firms can earn higher profits per innovation and
reduce their R&D efforts is sensitive to model assumptions and does
not hold up to alternative specifications.  If production is transferred
through FDI rather than through imitation, product innovation and
technology diffusion are strengthened under tighter IPRs.164  This
points to the need for developing economies to remove impediments
to inward FDI as they strengthen their intellectual property systems.
Studies based on game theory demonstrate that, while the mode of
technology transfer is affected by the level of IPRs protection,165 the
quality of the transferred technologies rises with stronger IPRs.166
Another theoretical study shows that technology transfer expands
with stronger patents when there is competition between foreign and
domestic innovators.167  Failure to provide patents removes the incen-
tive for the foreign firm to license its best-practice technologies.168
Finally, in cases where local imitation requires knowledge that is
J. DEV. STUD., October 1972, at 71, 71-73; R. MICHAEL GADBAW & TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT 1-2 (1988);
UNCTAD, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 15.
159. See Elhanan Helpman, Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights, 61
ECONOMETRICA 1247, 1247 (1993); Amy Glass & Kamal Saggi, Intellectual Property Rights,
Foreign Direct Investment, and Innovation 1-2 (August 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
160. See Helpman, supra note 159.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1257; Glass & Saggi, supra note 159, at 21.
163. See Helpman, supra note 159, at 1248, 1261; Glass & Saggi, supra note 159, at 21.
164. See Edwin L.C. Lai, International Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Rate
of Product Innovation, 55 J. DEV. ECON. 133 (1998).
165. For example, internalization through FDI is the preferred mechanism in countries with
weak patents.
166. See Sharmila Vishwasrao, Intellectual Property Rights and the Mode of Technology
Transfer, 44 J. DEV. ECON. 381, 399 (1994).
167. See M. Scott Taylor, Trips, Trade, and Growth, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 361, 377 (1994).
168. See id.
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available only through the licensed use of technology, the foreign li-
censors make lower-quality technologies available.169  This reduces
the licensee’s incentive to imitate the technology, reducing both the
quality and extent of knowledge transfer.170
Studies of international patenting behavior provide an optimistic
view.171  While the value of patent rights varies across countries and
technology fields, it is usually significant in developing countries,
suggesting that stronger patents would induce further R&D and pat-
ent applications.172  Considerable spillovers of technological knowl-
edge appear through patenting and trade in patented products.173
The importance of technology transfer through trade in techno-
logically advanced inputs174 should also be emphasized.  Evidence in-
dicates that such trade is responsible for significant productivity gains
across borders and is a crucial part of the technology convergence
that has emerged among the developed economies in recent dec-
ades.175  This suggests that emerging economies have a joint interest
in trade liberalization and linking their IPRs systems with those of
developed countries.  The resulting gains in productivity spillovers
could easily outweigh any costs associated with additional market
power.
While all these studies point to the significance of IPRs, ulti-
mately IPRs may no longer play much of a role in determining loca-
tional choices.  To the extent that different levels of IPRs across na-
tions currently act as locational determinants of FDI and technology
transfer, the trend toward harmonization of IPRs within TRIPS will
offset such advantages.176  That is, the attractiveness of countries that
are strengthening their IPRs will increase, the relative attractiveness
of those already affording strong IPRs will decrease.177  This harmoni-
zation of global minimum standards presents great opportunities for
firms that develop technologies and products because they will no
longer have to pay as much attention to local protection and en-
169. See Katharine Rockett, The Quality of Licensed Technology, 8 INT’L J. INDUS. TECH.
559, 559-60 (1990).
170. See id.
171. See Eaton & Kortum, supra note 156, at 275-76.
172. See id. at 252.
173. See id. (claiming that, except for the United States, the OECD countries have derived
substantial productivity growth from importing knowledge through patents).
174. For example, machinery, chemicals, software, and producer services.
175. See Coe & Helpman, supra note 156, at 861, 875.
176. See Maskus, supra note 13, at 201-202.
177. See id.
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forcement problems in safeguarding their proprietary information.178
In turn, they can focus their R&D programs on those areas with the
highest global payoffs.
D. Intellectual Property Rights in a Broader Context
So far the narrow focus of this Article has been on the interac-
tion between IPRs and incentives for FDI and technology transfer.
Many analysts, however, claim that strong IPRs play a much larger
role in signaling to potential investors that a particular country rec-
ognizes and protects the rights of foreign firms to make strategic
business decisions with few government impediments.179  In this view,
trade liberalization (the removal of market restrictions at the border)
is insufficient to provide assurances that an economy is becoming
more open to international commerce.180  Market access could remain
blocked by inefficient investment regulations, limited rights of estab-
lishment, domestic credit, production and marketing controls, arbi-
trary or punitive taxes, licensing restrictions, and weak IPRs.181
Stronger IPRs are also considered a signaling device to convey a
commitment to move from opaque to transparent legal systems, from
arbitrary pronouncements to unbiased enforcement of commercial
laws, and from corruption to professionalism in public manage-
ment.182  The objective is to attract more FDI through this signal,
whatever the particular incentives that may be generated in various
sectors by stronger IPRs.183  To date, there is little evidence support-
ing the responsiveness of investment to this signal, but there is a
widespread and growing belief in its importance in emerging econo-
178. See id. at 196.
179. See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT 6, 8, 191-93 (1990).
180. See Bernard Hoekman, Focal Points and Multilateral Negotiations on the Contestability
of Markets, in QUIET PIONEERING: ROBERT M. STEM AND HIS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LEGACY 171, 172 (Keith E. Maskus et al. eds., 1997).
181. See id. at 172, 178 (arguing that the issue of attaining market access through rationali-
zation of these internal barriers to competition is now at the top of the international trade-
policy agenda).
182. See SHERWOOD, supra note 179, at 109, 193. One prominent example is the negotia-
tion of the North American Free Trade Agreement, in which Mexico agreed to strengthen its
standards for intellectual property protection to a level virtually equivalent to those in the
United States.  See Maskus supra note 2, at 685-88.  Mexico did so in part to convey that it
would respect business rights in a transparent manner and would commit itself not to undoing
that change in policy.  See id.
183. See SHERWOOD, supra note 179, at 192.
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mies.184  This explains why, despite serious questions about the wis-
dom of doing so, several poor countries with limited technical capa-
bilities have unilaterally strengthened their IPRs laws and enforce-
ment in the 1990s.185  They prefer not to be left behind in the global
competition for capital and technology.  It also helps explain the uni-
versal acceptance of TRIPS.
III.  THE ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE ON FDI,
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND GROWTH
Despite the apparent importance that IPRs could play in FDI
decisions, until recently IPRs have not been incorporated into em-
pirical work on the determinants of FDI.186  This reflects both skepti-
cism about the significance of IPRs and the difficulty of measuring
both IPRs and their impacts.187  Economists have instead focused on
variables capturing the influence of macroeconomic factors, risk,
wage costs, trade impediments, industrial structures, taxes, infrastruc-
ture, and other incentives or disincentives to FDI.188
A. Main Determinants of FDI
The following discussion lists the major influences on the deci-
sion of MNEs to invest in various countries by grouping them into
types.189  Within each type, an attempt is made to assess the relative
importance of each factor, though this is difficult to do in general
terms because the factors are interrelated and vary across countries
and time periods.  In interpreting these factors, it is important to note
that a decision to invest depends positively on the investment’s ex-
pected future profitability and negatively on its expected profit vari-
ability, or risk.190
184. See id. at 67, 92.
185. See id. at 178; Maskus supra note 2, at 682 (including Indonesia, Philippines, and Viet
Nam.).
186. See Maskus supra note 13, at 198.
187. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, International Transactions in Intellectual
Property and Developing Countries, 17 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. (forthcoming 1999).
188. See discussion infra Part IV.
189. See Wheeler & Mody supra note 102, at 71-72; Ray Barrell & Nigel Pain, An
Econometric Analysis of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment, 78 REV. ECON. STAT. 200, 206 (1996);
Irving B. Kravis & Robert E. Lipsey, Location of Overseas Production and Production for Ex-
port by U.S. Multinational Firms, 12 J. INT’L ECON. 201, 202-03, 221-22 (1982); Claudy G.
Culem, The Locational Determinants of Direct Investments Among Industrialized Countries, 32
EUR. ECON. REV. 885, 888-90 (1988); Grubert & Mutti, supra note 49, at 290-93; Amirahmadi
& Wu, supra note 42, at 173-84.
190. See Wheeler & Mody, supra note 102, at 60.  See generally David O. Cushman, Real
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1.  Macroeconomic Factors.  Market size191 in the recipient
country is a major factor in attracting FDI.192  The larger the market,
the greater the incentive to enter through FDI in order to take
advantage of scale economies.193  To the extent regional trade
agreements expand the size of the region that local production can
service without restrictions, the importance of market size favors
such agreements as a means of encouraging inward FDI.194
The rate of growth of real gross domestic product also has a
strong positive effect on incoming FDI195 because additional invest-
ment, including FDI, is often required to meet the needs of a growing
economy.196  This is consistent with the concentration of FDI in the
developing economies of East Asia and Latin America in the last ten
years.197
As predicted by theoretical studies,198 the level of GNP per capita
affects both the amount of FDI and its nature.  Total investment rises
with the level of economic development because such increases shift
preferences toward goods with a higher technology content or with
more product differentiation and higher quality.199  This factor also
causes FDI to become more horizontal as development proceeds.200
Some analysts also emphasize the role of exchange rate changes
in influencing FDI flows.  A current real appreciation of the dollar
induces U.S. firms to move forward their planned FDI in Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries
because of cheaper local acquisition costs, affecting the temporal pat-
Exchange Rate Risk, Expectations, and the Level of Direct Investment, 32 REV. ECON. STAT.
299-300 (1985).
191. See Wheeler & Mody, supra note 102, at 59; Kravis & Lipsey, supra note 189, at 216;
Culem, supra note 189, at 888. (measuring market size by real GNP or GDP).
192. See Wheeler & Mody, supra note 102, at 59-60; Barrell & Pain, supra note 189, at 106;
Brainard, supra note 68, at 523.
193. See Wheeler & Mody, supra note 102, at 59-60.  The elasticity of incoming manufac-
turing FDI with respect to real GDP is estimated at 1.24 and this coefficient is highly signifi-
cant.  See Wheeler & Mody, supra note 102, at 67.  Thus, a one-percent increase in real GDP
could be expected to increase FDI by more than one percent.  See id.  This elasticity rises
sharply with the level of development; for poor countries the elasticity of FDI with respect to
market size is 0.24.  See id.
194. See Greenaway, supra note 17, at 118-22.
195. See Barrell & Pain, supra note 189, at 205.
196. See id.
197. See Amirahmadi & Wu, supra note 42, at 170-71.
198. See id. at 180; Culem, supra note 189, at 888.
199. See STEVEN HUSTED & MICHAEL MELVIN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 139-42 (4th
ed. 1997); Zhang, supra note 93, at 91, 94; MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 197, 203, 205.
200. See Zhang, supra note 93, at 60-61, 91, 94.
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tern of investment if not the long term stock value of the firms.201
However, an expected future real appreciation of the dollar tends to
postpone U.S. investment.202  Considerable riskiness in real exchange
rates tends to increase FDI because MNEs find it profitable to re-
duce exports, but offset this reduction by increasing foreign produc-
tion.203  Overall, however, there is relatively little agreement among
economists that such exchange-rate factors are systematic and impor-
tant in the long run.
2.  Relative Input Costs.  Differences in real unit labor costs
between the source and host countries are an important determinant
of locational decisions.204  With regard to input costs, vertical
investment is more sensitive to wage differences than is horizontal
investment.205
Several studies include differences in relative costs of capital206
between the host and source countries to account for decisions of
MNEs on where to finance the investment.207  While these costs do
influence the location of financing, they seem to have relatively little
impact on the extent of FDI.208
Finally, much of the vertical investment in extractive sectors is
driven by abundant local availability and low cost of natural re-
sources.209  This has some effect on decisions on where to locate as-
sembly operations that rely on resource inputs.210
3.  Agglomeration Effects.  Agglomeration occurs if, as the
number of firms in a particular location rises, the costs of production
for all firms fall together.211  A primary reason for this is that
201. See Barrell & Pain, supra note 189, at 205.
202. See id.
203. See Cushman supra note 190, at 297, 301-02, 306.
204. See Wheeler & Mody, supra note 102, at 66, 68.  This study found that this is the most
significant variable in explaining U.S. investment in the electronics industry, with an average
elasticity of 1.99.  That is, a fall in relative labor costs of one percent raises FDI by 1.99% in
electronics.  This elasticity is even higher in the poorest countries. For total manufacturing in-
vestment, however, the relative-wage effect is much smaller, though significant.  See id. at 66.
205. This can be seen when using electronics FDI as a proxy for vertical FDI.  See id.
206. Measured as interest rate or user costs of capital.
207. See Culem, supra note 189, at 886; Grubert & Mutti, supra note 49, at 285.
208. See Culem, supra note 189, at 900; Grubert & Mutti, supra note 49, at 293.
209. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 13.
210. For example, firms are often able to minimize transport costs, including damages from
spoilage, by locating food-processing operations, such as sugar refineries and canning facilities,
near sources of agricultural supply.
211. See Donald F. Smith, Jr. & Richard Florida, Agglomeration and Industrial Location:
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concentrated investment activities encourage the development of
higher quality, differentiated producer inputs, such as engineering
skills and finance.212  As the pool of specialized labor expands, new
firms find it advantageous to locate in the area.213
The effectiveness of agglomeration in attracting FDI214 depends
on the amount and quality of supporting infrastructure in the econ-
omy215 and on market size.216  Infrastructure refers to facilities for
trade, transportation, communication, and energy use.  Thus, if a
country is interested in industrial development through attracting in-
vestment into a particular region, it must pay attention to developing
infrastructure and establishing a large and vibrant market (even if
exported) for the output.
4.  Policy Variables.  There is some evidence that in corporate
tax rates, FDI is sensitive to differences across countries.217  But,
while taxes are potentially important in attracting FDI, these findings
are apparently controversial among economists and await further
verification.218
Disincentives to investment, for example, investment regulations
such as local content requirements, ownership limits, and profit repa-
triation controls, have been found to have a strong negative effect on
inward FDI.219  Thus, if limiting investment is the goal, such policies
An Econometric Analysis of Japanese-Affiliated Manufacturing Establishments in Automotive-
Related Industries, 36 J. URB. ECON. 23, 23-24 (1994).  Hanson, supra note 60, at 1270-77, finds
considerable evidence of such effects in the Mexican apparel sector.  On the concept of ag-
glomeration, see generally Paul R. Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99
J. POL. ECON. 483, 494-98 (1991); PAUL R. KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (1991);
Keith Head et al., Agglomeration Benefits and Location Choice: Evidence from Japanese Manu-
facturing Investment in the United States, 38 J. INT’L ECON. 223 (1995); Wheeler & Mody supra
note 102; Culem, supra note 189.
212. See James R. Markusen, Trade in Producer Services and in Other Specialized Interme-
diate Inputs, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 85 (1989); Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic
Geography, supra note 211; Hanson supra note 60, at 1266.
213. See Markusen, supra note 212, at 85-86; Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic
Geography, supra note 211.
214. For example, the significance in FDI decisions has been shown by Wheeler & Mody,
supra note 102, at 66-72.
215. See id. at 69.
216. This follows logically from the whole idea of agglomeration.  See id. at 63-64.
217. See Grubert & Mutti, supra note 49, at 286-90. The authors found that a reduction in
the host-country tax rate from 20% to 10% could increase the stock of plant and equipment
owned by U.S. affiliates in a particular country by 65%.  See id.
218. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 171, 186-87.
219. See Grubert & Mutti, supra note 49, at 290 (using dummy variables for countries that
do not allow more than 50% equity ownership for foreign investors); Wheeler & Mody, supra
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are effective.  In contrast, tax breaks and other production incentives,
such as those found in “Export Processing Zones,” have variable ef-
fectiveness at encouraging FDI across countries.220
Trade policy also strongly affects incentives for FDI.  The tradi-
tional view held that high tariffs would encourage incoming FDI in
order to produce behind the tariff walls what could not be exported
to a protectionist country.221  As globalization proceeded in the last
decade, however, the issue became more ambiguous.  On the one
hand, trade barriers provide a protected market for firms, which en-
courages location of final goods production.222  However, the same
barriers also restrict access of MNEs to the latest international tech-
nologies, as those are only available by importing machinery, chemi-
cals, and other key inputs.223  Because international firms place in-
creasing importance on the ability to buy producer inputs at cheapest
cost and highest quality, closed economies are likely to attract less in-
vestment today than they may have in the past.224  Moreover, it is in-
note 102, at 60.
220. See Amirahmadi & Wu, supra note 42, at 183. Those incentives seem to have been par-
ticularly effective in China, with over 12% of FDI going to such zones in the 1980s, though this
finding does not control for other Chinese influences.  See id.
221. A number of studies from the 1970s and early 1980s were consistent with this theory.
See Robert E. Baldwin, Determinants of Trade and Foreign Investment: Further Evidence, 61
REV. ECON. & STAT. 40, 40-48 (1979); Edward J. Ray, The Determinants of Foreign Direct In-
vestment in the United States, 1979-85, in TRADE POLICIES FOR INTERNATIONAL COM-
PETITIVENESS 53, 66 (Robert C. Feenstra ed., 1989); Kar-Yiu Wong, Optimal Threat of Trade
Restriction and Quid Pro Quo Foreign Investment,  1 ECON. & POL. 277, passim (1989); Robert
E. Lipsey & Merle Yahr Weiss, Foreign Production and Exports in Manufacturing Industries,
63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 488, passim (1981); Thomas Horst, Firm and Industry Determinants of
the Decision to Invest Abroad: An Empirical Study, 54 REV. ECON. & STAT. 258, 259-61 (1972);
Irving B. Kravis & Robert E. Lipsey, The Location of Overseas Production and Production for
Export by U.S. Multinational Firms, 12 J. INT’L ECON. 201, 209-11 (1982); Culem, supra note
189, 889.  However, such protection rarely attracted much investment into developing coun-
tries, as their governments also tended to impose significant investment barriers in order to re-
serve local markets for domestic firms.  See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 77-79.
222. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 77-79.
223. See id.
224. See Wheeler & Mody, supra note 102, at 64, 66-67; Zhen Quan Wang & Nigel J.
Swain, The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transforming Economies: Empirical
Evidence from Hungary and China, 131 WELTWIRSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV [REV. WORLD
ECON.] 359,  373 (1995). In Wheeler and Mody’s study, they show that U.S. firms have tended
to invest more in restrictive economies than in open economies.  See Wheeler & Moody, supra
102, at 67.  The data, however, is contradicted by the more recent study done by Wang and
Swain, which shows that FDI in China and Hungary FDI was negatively related to tariff rates.
Indeed, high tariff rates appear to reduce FDI in China markedly.  See Wang & Swain, supra, at
373.  Comparing these two studies, one can infer that firms have changed their approach to FDI
with regard to the relative openness of a host economy to favor more open rather then more
restrictive economies.  See id.
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creasingly apparent that in rapidly growing economies, FDI flows and
merchandise trade increase together, rather than substitute for one
another.225  Thus, trade liberalization is now an important comple-
ment to programs encouraging investment.
Finally, both FDI and technology transfer through licensing are
likely to rise as an economy’s technological capacities improve.226
Key in this process is the development of an abundant human capital
stock, because labor skills are required for absorbing, using, and im-
proving incoming technology.227  Thus, educational competence, par-
ticularly in technical and managerial areas, is significant.228  Also im-
portant are professional support programs for technology transfer
and technology diffusion.229
5.  Risk Factors. Multinational enterprises are less likely to invest
in countries with risks of expropriation, limited and variable profit
repatriation rules, terrorism and violence, corruption, bureaucracy
and red tape, ineffective legal systems, and considerable income
inequality.230  Thus, both macroeconomic certainty and political
stability are important to MNEs.  How significant this factor is in
relation to others depends on the type and duration of investment.
One related finding worth mentioning is that countries that re-
press labor organization rights, in the hope that a stable, quiescent,
and low-wage labor force will attract FDI, do not receive more in-
vestment as a result.231  Apparently, it is far less important to provide
firms with artificial advantages and far more important to develop a
stable and transparent set of rules for business operation.
B. Evidence on Intellectual Property Rights
A few studies have included the strength of IPRs as a potential
determinant of FDI.  Three early studies did not find any relationship
225. See Markusen, supra note 7, at 180-81.
226. See CAVES, supra note 13, at 10; TEECE, supra note 104, at 43-55.
227. See TEECE, supra note 104, at 43-55; Maskus, supra note 13, at 200.
228. See TEECE, supra note 104, at 43-55.
229. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, FOSTERING
TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMISM: EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT ON TECHNOLOGICAL DEVEL-
OPMENT PROCESSES AND COMPETITIVENESS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE U.N. TDBOR,
at 14-24, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DST/9 (1996) [hereinafter UNCTAD, TECHNOLOGICAL
DYNAMISM].
230. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 94-95, 128-32.
231. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE,
EMPLOYMENT, AND LABOUR STANDARDS 112-21 (1996).
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between crude measures of intellectual property protection and the
international distribution of FDI by U.S. multinational enterprises.232
But as these articles suffered from methodological problems,233 their
results should be largely discounted.
There are two recent studies that discuss the role of IPRs as a
determinant of FDI that are more noteworthy than previous studies.
The first study found that weak IPRs have a significant negative im-
pact on the location of U.S. FDI.234  It also found that the proportion
of FDI devoted to final production or R&D facilities is negatively
and significantly associated with weakness of IPRs protection.235
Moreover, the weakness of IPRs had much less impact on the deci-
sions of firms with limited ownership (less than 50%) of local affili-
ates, because such firms would be unlikely to transfer their frontier
technologies in any case.  From these results, it appears both the vol-
ume and quality of investment are diminished in countries with lim-
ited IPRs.236
The second study237 used equations238 to measure the impact of
stronger patent rights on FDI decisions, as shown in Table 8.239  It
appears that FDI, as measured by the asset stock, reacts positively to
232.  See Michael J. Ferrantino, The Effect of Intellectual Property Rights on International
Trade and Investment, 129 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV [REV. WORLD ECON.] 300, 322-
23 (1993); Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellecutal Property: Effects on Investment,
Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107, 114 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993);
Maskus & Eby-Konan, supra note 134, at 414-15.
233. Problems like limited specification of models and poor measurements of IPRs.
234. See Lee & Mansfield, supra note 88, at 185-86.  The study used survey results to de-
velop an index of perceived weakness of IPRs in destination countries on the part of U.S. firms.
See id. at 182.  They regressed the volume of U.S. direct investment in various countries over
the period 1990-1992 on this index, along with measures of market size, the past investment
stock, the degree of industrialization, a measure of openness, and a dummy variable for Mexico
to control for its special investment relationship with the United States.  See id. at 183.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See Maskus, supra note 13, at 186-208.  The study argues that the prior literature is
incorrectly specified in that it does not recognize the joint decisions made by MNEs.  See id. at
198.  In particular, multinational firms may choose to export, raise sales from existing foreign
operations, increase investment, or transfer technology directly in response to stronger patent
rights.  See id.
238. Maskus estimates a simultaneous set of equations to capture these joint impacts, con-
trolling for market size, tariff protection, the level of local R&D by affiliates, distance from the
United States, and investment incentives and disincentives provided by local authorities.  See
Maskus, supra note 13, at 199.  This is done for a panel of fourty-six destination countries, using
annual data from 1989-1992.  See id.
239. The coefficients express elasticities.
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patent strength in developing countries.240  While these results await
further confirmation, they suggest that FDI is sensitive to patent
rights, consistent with the first study discussed previously.
Other studies support the conclusion that a policy of weak IPRs
in technology-recipient nations reduces the quality of technology
transferred.241  Evidence also exists that the effectiveness of IPRs pro-
tection in inducing technical innovation and technology transfer de-
pends on the trade orientation of an economy.  For example, one
study found that firms’ propensities to develop their own technolo-
gies or to purchase them from foreign sources are both negatively
related to the degree of trade protection they enjoyed.242  Thus, in
closed economies, protecting IPRs may not expand innovation much
because the competitive conditions are inadequate to stimulate it.
Another study showed that as countries liberalize their trade regimes,
accompanying strengthening of IPRs provides a more affirmative
path to economic growth.243
IV.  POLICIES TO ATTRACT BENEFICIAL FDI AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
In theory, investment and licensing flows do not necessarily in-
crease with a strengthening of IPRs.  The foregoing review indicates
240. These elasticities suggest that a 1% rise in the extent of patent protection would ex-
pand the stock of U.S. investment in that country by 0.45%, other things being equal.  See
Maskus, supra note 13, at 199.  This is a significantly positive elasticity and, indeed, trails only
the responsiveness of FDI to policy incentives.
241. See Howard Davies, Technology Transfer Through Commercial Transactions, 26 J.
IND. ECON. 161, 174 (1977) (concluding that difficulties in securing property rights over the
profits accruing to technical information raise powerful barriers to information trades between
developed and developing economies); CONTRACTOR, supra note 28, at 121 (reviewing a sam-
ple of 102 technology licenses provided by U.S. firms and his regression results support the hy-
pothesis that returns to a technology supplier increase with patent protection in the recipient
nation.  He found that technologies transferred to developing countries tend to be significantly
older than those transferred to industrialized economies.  While these findings are dated, they
point to the significance of patent regimes in attracting technology through licensing).
242. See Helson Braga & Larry Wilmore, Technological Imports and Technological Effort:
An Analysis of Their Determinants in Brazilian Firms, 39 J. IND. ECON. 421, 429 (1991) (using a
survey of more than 3000 Brazilian companies).
243. See David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323, 338-46 (1996) (performing cross-country growth re-
gressions using data on patent protection, openness of trade regimes, and country-specific
characteristics.  They found that patent strength is an important determinant of economic
growth across countries and that this effect is stronger in relatively open economies.  In their
preferred specification, estimates suggested that growth induced by IPRs protection (at moder-
ate levels of protection among developing countries) is approximately 0.66% higher per year in
open economies than in closed economies).
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emerging empirical evidence in favor of that hypothesis.  The idea
that foreign direct investment and the acquisition of new technolo-
gies through FDI and licensing are beneficial for the recipient coun-
try seems to be increasingly taken for granted.  While a strong pre-
sumption in this direction exists, it is not a necessary outcome in all
situations.  Rather, to ensure these gains for the long term, it is im-
portant that such flows result in stronger competition.  After a brief
review of the potential benefits and costs of these activities, this sec-
tion discusses the components of a coherent policy approach to en-
hance the likelihood that stronger IPRs in an emerging economy will
contribute to such a dynamic competition.
A. Benefits and Costs of Inward FDI and Licensing
Although their impacts vary across countries and over time, FDI
and licensing bear considerable promise for improving efficiency and
growth in developing countries, particularly those that have scarce
capital, are far away from the efficient production frontier, and have
limited managerial and entrepreneurial talents.244  These arrange-
ments provide access to the technological and managerial assets of
foreign MNEs, which provide both a direct spur to productivity and
significant spillover benefits as they diffuse throughout the econ-
omy.245  This diffusion comes through numerous channels, including
the movement of newly trained labor among enterprises, the laying
out of patents, product innovation through the legitimate “inventing
around” of patents and copyrights, and the adoption of newer and
more efficient specialized inputs that reduce production costs.246  Fur-
ther, the introduction of efficient and competitive international en-
terprises can stimulate local entrepreneurship and innovation by in-
creasing competition and raising demands for sub-contracting.247
Additional benefits include access to a wider variety of specialized
products, inputs, and technologies, a deeper and better-trained
skilled labor pool, and rising real wages.248  Finally, there could also
244. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 88-96.
245. See GENE GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 238, 336-38 (1991); THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 88-96; Amirah-
madi and Wu, supra note 42, at 185.
246. See GROSSMAN & HELPMAN, supra note 245, at 336-38; THE WORLD BANK, supra
note 16, at 88-96; Coe & Helpman, supra note 156, at 875-76.  Software is particularly impor-
tant in this context.
247. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 88-96; Coe & Helpman, supra note 156, at
875-76.
248. See GROSSMAN & HELPMAN, supra note 245, at 334-39; Paul R. Krugman, A Model of
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be a beneficial demonstration effect for local firms.249  Thus, success-
ful adoption of competition-enhancing FDI and licensing should ma-
terially improve the knowledge base of those developing economies
and move them towards the globally efficient production frontier.
Currently, developing countries suffer from significantly lagging
labor productivity and managerial efficiency, related in part to a fail-
ure to adopt newest technologies.250  But recent experiences in nu-
merous developing economies indicate that liberalization of trade
policies and investment regimes can have significantly positive
growth impacts, even if there is some initial economic adjustment pe-
riod.251  There is little doubt that a major determinant of the relatively
rapid economic growth and industrial restructuring in East Asia has
been access to foreign technologies through both licensing and FDI,
in addition to importation of advanced machinery and other technical
inputs.252  Because wider access to knowledge allows economic expan-
sion to continue without necessarily running into diminishing returns,
these growth effects can be expected to be long-lasting.253
However, the beneficial impact of inward FDI and technology
transfer does not come without costs.  If there are insignificant link-
ages to other economic sectors, FDI may operate in enclaves with
limited spillovers into technologies adopted and wages earned by lo-
cal firms and workers.254  This limited diffusion could be insufficient
to compensate emerging economies for the payments to MNEs.255
Because of those payments (i.e., profit repatriation and license fees),
the terms of this exchange could be unfavorable in a social sense, if
Innovation, Technology Transfer, and the World Distribution of Income, 87 J. POL. ECON. 253,
263-66 (1979).
249. The “demonstration effect” refers to the possibility that, by virtue of observing the
successful management efforts of local subsidiaries of foreign firms, locally owned firms would
choose to adopt improved management techniques and to innovate more rapidly.
250. See Daniel Trefler, The Case of the Missing Trade and Other Mysteries, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 1029, 1033 (1995); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., PRODUCTIVITY AND AMERICAN
LEADERSHIP 86-87 (1989).
251. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 98; THE WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at 13.
252. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at 7-8.
253. See GROSSMAN & HELPMAN, supra note 245, at 336; Paul M. Romer, Endogenous
Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S99 (Supp. 1990).
254. See Brian Aitken et al., Wages and Foreign Ownership: A Comparative Study of Mex-
ico, Venezuela, and the United States, 40 J. INT’L ECON. 345, 353 (1996).  For example, U.S.
multinationals operating in Mexico and Venezuela pay significantly higher wages than average
to their own employees but these wage impacts have not spread to other parts of the economy.
See id. at 353-54.
255. See MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 403.
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not in a private sense.256  This situation is aggravated to the extent
that MNEs engage in abusive practices of their protected market po-
sitions in exploiting stronger IPRs.  Such abuses could emerge in set-
ting restrictive licensing conditions, requiring technology grant-backs,
engaging in tied sales, tying up technology fields through cross-
licensing agreements, establishing vertical controls through distribu-
tion outlets that prevent product competition, and engaging in price
discrimination as well as predation against local firms.257  Thus, coun-
tries could find certain sectors of their economies increasingly coming
under the control of MNEs through exploitation of their specific ad-
vantages, including brand names, patented technology, marketing
skills, and economies of scale.
While these are possible and real costs, there is little evidence
they are systematic problems in many countries.  More fundamen-
tally, those costs relate to the failure to develop a policy system that
promotes the maximum gains from FDI.258  Enclave production, for
example, makes sense only when the subsidiary is encouraged to pro-
duce only for export rather than to compete locally as well.259  Firms
that are provided full access to local and regional markets are more
likely to erect complementary business systems (production, distribu-
tion, and services) that compete more widely in the economy and
generate greater spillover benefits.260  Abusive practices are possible
only to the extent that monopoly positions are protected and toler-
ated.261  Many developing economies have not yet developed appro-
priate competition rules to deal with these issues, preferring instead
to forego the benefits of FDI and licensing by claiming an unwilling-
ness to suffer such abuses, at least at the hands of foreign firms.262
B. Intellectual Property Rights
IPRs do not necessarily generate monopoly market positions
that result in high prices, limited access, and exclusive use of tech-
256. See id. at 400-03.
257. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COM-
PETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 104-06 (1989).
258. See UNCTAD, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 17; Maskus, supra note 13,
at 203.
259. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 88-108.
260. See id. at 95.
261. See Maskus, supra note 13, at 191; Maskus & Yang, supra note 7.
262. Examples of countries that have not adopted competition policies include Indonesia,
Bangledesh, and Nigeria.  See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT: SPECIAL
TOPICS: TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY 46-47 (1997).
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nologies.  Those rights are similar to standard property rights in that
they define the conditions within which a right owner competes with
rivals.263  Except in particular sectors, cases in which a patent holder
or copyright owner becomes a strong monopolist are infrequent.264
Usually there will be competing products and technologies, including
new ones, that do not infringe the property right.265  Much depends on
the scope of the product and process claims protected and on the
technical characteristics of the invention.266
Thus, IPRs can encourage dynamic competition even if they may
sometimes diminish competition among existing products.  For ex-
ample, survey evidence indicates that patent disclosure requirements
are significant mechanisms for diffusing technical information to
competitors within a short period.267  The information may then be
used to develop a new product or process that competes with the
original.268  This incremental nature of innovation is a key factor in
most technical progress and generally builds dynamic competition
rather than investing unassailable market power.269 Thus, patents,
copyrights, and other IPRs can raise the costs of imitation, but likely
do not materially retard competing product introduction.270  Moreo-
ver, patents and trademarks provide greater certainty to firms, lower
the costs of transferring technology, and facilitate monitoring of li-
censee operations.271  Additional licensing could then result in greater
adaptive innovation in user firms.
In this view, stronger IPRs in developing economies promise
long-term growth and efficiency benefits as they attract additional
FDI and licensing and spur further follow-on innovation and tech-
263. See UNCTAD, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 13, 15.
264. See id. at 15.
265. See id.  For example, narrow patent claims are relatively easy to invent around in gen-
erating follow-on innovation.  See id.
266. See id at 15, 19.
267. See Mansfield, supra note 156, at 217-23.
268. See UNCTAD, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 15; Suzanne Scotchmer,
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. Winter 1991, at 29, 33; JEROME H. REICHMAN, RATIONALIZING NATIONAL IN-
NOVATION POLICIES: A PRO-COMPETITIVE STRATEGY FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 10 (1996).
269. See Scotchmer, supra note 268, at 30; UNCTAD, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note
95, at 15.
270. See Scotchmer, supra note 268, at 31; Edwin Mansfield, et al., Imitation Costs and Pat-
ents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 910, 913 (1981); UNCTAD, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT,
supra note 95, at 15.
271. See Maskus & Yang, supra note 7; CONTRACTOR, supra note 28, at 133-35;
SHERWOOD, supra note 179, at 191-93.
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nology spillovers.  This outcome is far more likely, however, if the
implementation of stronger IPRs is accompanied by complementary
policies that promote dynamic competition.
C. Broader Policy Approaches
Overall, wider market access to the local economy, in conjunc-
tion with sensible competition rules and related regulatory systems,
promises the greatest net benefits from FDI.272  Thus, emerging
economies that wish to increase their attractiveness to foreign inves-
tors should first proceed with significant market liberalization.  While
the Uruguay Round committed most countries to cut their trade bar-
riers,273 further reduction of tariffs and removal of non-tariff barriers
on a credible and irrevocable schedule would be an important signal
of openness to foreign investors.  Regional trade integration, par-
ticularly with developed economies that could be the source of addi-
tional FDI, could assist in this process.  However, such agreements
also bear potential for trade and investment diversion and should be
considered carefully in each instance.
In light of the complementary nature of FDI in production and
services with merchandise trade, developing countries also need to
expand rights of establishment in services.  Removal or rationaliza-
tion of various investment regulations, such as local content require-
ments, equity restrictions, and limitations on profit repatriation,
would further expand investment incentives.274  Finally, continued
privatization of state-owned enterprises could attract further capital
as it raises domestic competition.
In light of the econometric studies on the determinants of FDI,275
it is important for emerging economies to pursue sound and stable
macroeconomic policies.276  The development of a modern and effi-
cient infrastructure is also important and could be instrumental in
promoting agglomeration gains that attract cumulatively higher
amounts of both domestic and foreign investment.  There is also evi-
dence that FDI flows are sensitive to international variations in taxes
272. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 88; David M. Gould & William C. Gruben,
The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323, 345-46
(1996).
273. See THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 12, at 4.
274. Especially, as it is likely that such regulations generate net welfare losses for the coun-
tries imposing them, in any case.
275. See discussion supra Part III.A.
276. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 101-02; Grubaugh, supra note 126, at 150-51.
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and incentives.277  While this provides some argument for fiscal ad-
vantages,278 it primarily suggests the importance of relatively low tax
rates and uniform tax treatment of all investors, both domestic and
foreign.  Certainty and stability in taxes are more effective in pro-
moting investment than are discriminatory and arbitrary policies,
while uniform tax schedules can generate considerable efficiencies in
resource usage.279  Similarly, there is no evidence that repression of
labor rights aids in attracting FDI or promoting exports.280  Rather,
firms are more interested in market size, stability, and growth. 281
An important component of any program to attract high-quality
FDI and technology transfer is the development of a competent in-
digenous technological capacity.  In the first instance, this calls for
public and private investments in education and training and the re-
moval of impediments to the acquisition of human capital.282  It also
points toward the development of national innovation systems that
promote dynamic competition.283  This involves supporting basic re-
search capabilities, removing disincentives for applied R&D and its
commercialization, instituting incentive structures that help stimulate
local innovation, and taking greater advantage of access to scientific
and technical information that exists within the global information
infrastructure.284  To date, governments and firms in many developing
countries have made inadequate progress in this regard.285
IPRs are an important component of any technology develop-
ment program.  In implementing stronger IPRs, as required by
TRIPS or other policy initiatives,286 emerging economies will need to
277. See Grubert & Mutti, supra note 49, at 293.
278. Like, for example, tax holidays, accelerated depreciation allowances, tariff exemp-
tions, and EPZs.
279. See Denise Konan & Keith E. Maskus, Joint Trade Liberalization and Tax Reform in
a Small Open Economy: The Case of Egypt 13-15 (August 1998) (manuscript on file with the
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
280. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE,
EMPLOYMENT, AND LABOR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 123 (1996).
281. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 98.  In any case, the technical superiority of
any investments that would be so attracted in labor-intensive sectors is likely to be quite lim-
ited.
282. See UNCTAD, TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMISM, supra note 229, at 31, 35; UNCTAD,
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 22.
283. See UNCTAD, TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMISM, supra note 229, at 67.
284. See UNCTAD, TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMISM, supra note 229, at 114-16; UNCTAD,
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 22.
285. See UNCTAD, TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMISM, supra note 229, at 115.
286. See UNCTAD, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 1-2; Keith E. Maskus, Im-
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strike a balance between needs for technology acquisition, market
access, and diffusion.  Most nations will wish to adopt a set of IPRs
regulations that do not significantly disadvantage follow-on inventors
and creators by making use of sensible fair-use exemptions and com-
pensated compulsory licensing under tightly defined conditions and
by carefully defining the scope of protection.  Furthermore, it will be
important to implement effective competition rules to ensure that
IPRs systems are used advantageously.287  Such measures will require
considerable administrative and judicial expertise.
V.  CONCLUSION
While there is evidence that strengthening IPRs can be an effec-
tive means of inducing additional inward FDI, it is only one compo-
nent among a broad set of important factors.  Emerging economies
must recognize the strong complementary relationships among IPRs,
market liberalization and deregulation, technology development
policies, and competition regimes.  Given the complexity and the
tradeoffs for market participants, governments of emerging econo-
mies should devote considerable attention and analysis to strategies
to achieve net gains from stronger IPRs.
plications of Regional and Multilateral Agreements for Intellectual Property Rights, 20 WORLD
ECON. 681, 683 (1997).
287. For example, countries may wish to monitor the terms of key technology licensing
agreements or to intervene in contracts for the development of indigenous public resources.
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TABLE 1.  TOTAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS, SELECTED
COUNTRIES ($ MILLION)
Country 1987
Inward         Outward
1990
Inward         Outward
1995
Inward        Outward
United States 58220 28360 47920 29950 60230 95530
Canada 8040 8540 7855 4725 10786 5761
Japan 1170 19520 1760 48050 60 22660
Germany 1820 9760 2530 24210 8940 34890
United Kingdom 15696 31335 32430 19320 32210 40330
Spain 4571 745 13987 3522 6250 3574
Poland 12 8 89 n/a 3659 42
China 2314 645 3487 830 35849 2000
Korea 616 540 788 1056 1776 3529
Malaysia 423 n/a 2332 n/a 4348 n/a
Indonesia 385 n/a 1093 n/a 4348 603
Singapore 2836 206 5575 2034 6912 3906
Thailand 352 170 2444 140 2068 886
Egypt 948 19 734 12 598 93
Kenya 39 31 57 n/a 33 n/a
Turkey 115 9 684 16 885 113
Mexico 2621 n/a 2634 n/a 6963 n/a
Argentina -19 n/a 1836 n/a 1319 155
Brazil 1169 138 989 665 4859 1384
Chile 891 6 590 8 1695 687
Source: The statistics in this table were generally compiled by the author from Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 1987, 1990, and 1995 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS Y.B.
   TABLE 2.  NET RECEIPTS ON ROYALTIES, LICENSE FEES, BUSINESS SERVICES,
        AND DIRECT INVESTMENT INCOME, SELECTED COUNTRIES ($ MILLION)
1987 1990 1995
Country R & LF Bus Serv DIL R & LF Bus Serv DIL R & LF Bus Serv DIL
United States 8320 10200 32190 13500 14810 55600 20660 12870 57480
Japan -2520 -6630 2000 -3550 -11200 2550 -3350 -7500 6850
Germany -1290 -1670 -1400 -1810 -1980 -510 -2660 -5270 -640
United Kingdom 16 14334 6373 -450 7010 15460 1710 7160 20270
Spain -350 661 -1482 -932 -670 -2098 -1073 -1407 -1179
Poland n/a 178 n/a n/a -22 n/a -40 -231 -1028
China n/a 630 8 n/a 575 n/a n/a -3190 -9952
Korea -47 -65 -88 -99 -892 -145 -2086 830 -242
Malaysia n/a -318 -1077 n/a -527 -1863 n/a -1492 -3785
India -40 -144 n/a -71 252 n/a -68a -256a n/a
Egypt n/a -482 43 n/a -322 233 -50 694 -149
Turkey n/a 827 -80 n/a 1622 -161 n/a 2883 -272
Mexico -212 -371 -794 -307 -636 -2304 -370 -749 -2664
Brazil -36 -560 -1527 -42 -1151 -1865 -497 -370 -2044
Chile -30 0 -218 -37 -142 -333 -49 22 -890
Source: The statistics in this table were generally compiled by the author from International Monetary Fund, 1987, 1990, 1992,
and 1995 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS Y.B.
Note: aData for 1992.
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TABLE 3.  U.S. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES ($MILLION)
Country 1985  % Total 1990  % Total 1994  % Total
World 230250 100.0 426958 100.0 612109 100.0
Europe 105171 45.7 213368 50.0 300177 49.0
EU-12 83898 36.4 179102 41.9 251149 41.0
Germany 16764 7.3 27480 6.4 39886 6.5
U.K. 33024 14.3 72343 16.9 102244 16.7
Spain 2281 1.0 7802 1.8 8048 1.3
Turkey 234 0.1 515 0.1 1084 0.2
Canada 46909 20.4 69106 16.2 72808 11.9
Asia-Pacific 33983 14.8 63585 14.9 108402 17.7
Japan 9235 4.0 22511 5.3 37027 6.0
China n/a n/a 356 0.1 1699 0.3
Hong Kong 3295 1.4 5994 1.4 11988 2.0
Korea 743 0.3 2677 0.6 3612 0.6
Malaysia 1140 0.5 1513 0.4 2382 0.4
India 383 0.2 368 0.1 818 0.1
Latin America 28261 12.3 70752 16.6 114985 18.8
Mexico 5088 2.2 10255 2.4 16375 2.7
Brazil 8893 3.9 14268 3.3 18977 3.1
Chile 88 0.0 1876 0.4 4457 0.7
Africa 5891 2.6 3592 0.8 5472 0.9
Source: The statistics in this table were generally compiled by the author from issues
of the Office of Business Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce, SURVEY OF
CURRENT BUSINESS, for 1985, 1990, and 1994.
Note: Data are on Historical Cost Basis.
                                  TABLE 4.  U.S. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION BY MAJOR SECTOR IN
                                                                     SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1994 ($ MILLION)
Country TMF F&K CHEM MET MAC EEQ TREQ OMF TRD B&FIN SVC
World 220328 28796 51638 10974 30425 20922 28057 49516 67303 204574 22994
Europe 108655 13678 29239 5481 16773 8631 11731 23121 36435 107384 14813
EU-12 101009 11453 28328 5105 15527 7671 11042 21883 23584 86595 12825
Germany 22131 2103 4152 1469 4359 1306 5180 3562 4049 8999 946
U.K. 27247 3327 4560 1656 5022 2941 3201 6539 5564 47477 5034
Spain 4512 775 754 171 444 441 1104 821 824 2014 413
Turkey 693 139 130 n/a n/a 4 133 86 19 110 n/a
Canada 35037 3600 5856 2822 2024 1820 8548 10369 7006 12951 3509
Asia-Pacific 41577 4205 8870 1189 9019 7915 2875 7504 16829 20685 3259
Japan 15844 1121 3634 298 4425 1665 1842 2860 6844 6820 496
China 765 128 188 10 29 n/a n/a 89 131 n/a n/a
Hong Kong 1902 n/a 99 n/a 435 492 n/a 652 4209 4107 698
Korea 1391 261 291 66 40 195 78 460 422 1630 29
Malaysia 1582 5 66 n/a n/a 1209 0 208 142 210 0
India 308 25 166 9 84 5 5 14 37 442 23
Latin America 31932 6949 6534 1237 2436 1989 4819 7968 6574 61019 885
Mexico 10697 2792 2169 n/a n/a 579 1949 2390 994 1982 261
Brazil 13681 1794 2268 732 1904 935 2271 3777 402 3657 129
Chile 376 56 154 n/a 2 n/a n/a 190 262 1954 n/a
Africa 1274 292 n/a 207 n/a 47 82 266 248 922 86
% Developed 72 64 75 78 76 58 79 73 75 62 (77) 82
% Developing 28 36 25 22 24 42 21 27 25 38 (23) 18
Source: The statistics in this table were generally compiled by the author from issues of the Office of Business Economics, U.S.
Department of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, for 1994.
Abbreviations: TMF = total manufacturing; F&K = food and kindred products; CHEM = chemicals and allied products;
MET = primary and fabricated metals; MAC = industrial machinery; EEQ =electrical equipment; TREQ = transport equipment;
OMF = other manufacturing; TRD = wholesale trade; B&FIN = banking and finance; SVC = services.    
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TABLE 5.  INDICATORS OF MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY IN U.S. HIGH
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES, 1989A
Sector Affiliates
per
Parent
Total
Assets
Abroad
($bil)
Assets in
ECs
(%)b
Intrafirm
Sales (%)c
Intrafirm
Trade with
U.S. ($bil)
Industrial Chemicals and
Polymers
14.3 63.9 10.6 31.8 5.9
Pharmaceuticals 33.8 40.5 11.0 21.9 2.2
Industrial Machinery 6.4 22.4 19.2 29.4 6.4
Office Machines and
Computers
11.1 86.8 23.3 49.8 16.1
Telecommunications
Equipment
11.3 20.0 34.3 30.1 1.9
Electronic Components
and Circuits
5.2 10.1 41.3 49.4 11.4
Electrical Machinery 9.1 11.0 22.9 18.5 2.2
Motor Vehicles and Parts;
Aircraft
10.5 122.3 12.2 19.4 50.6
Printing, Publishing, Re-
cordings
5.3 5.7 5.5 4.4 0.1
Precision Instruments 5.8 21.9 12.0 33.1 4.8
All Manufacturing 8.5 593.8 15.6 30.8 114.8
Advertising 14.9 4.4 15.9 0.1 0.0
Motion Pictures 8.9 5.0 10.0 0.1 0.0
Health Services 2.9 1.6 31.7 0.0 0.0
Engineering, Architec-
tural Services
4.6 2.0 18.4 8.5 0.01
Finance, except banking 6.0 171.6 24.6 23.8 0.0
All Servicesd 5.0 219.9 21.2 17.7 31.8
Source: BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BENCHMARK
SURVEY OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD, 1989 (1992).
Notes: aData are for majority-owned non-bank affiliates of non-bank U.S. parents;
bPercentage of assets not located in Canada, Europe, Japan, or Australia; cIntrafirm
sales as a percentage of total sales; dWholesale trade, finance (except banking), and
services.
            TABLE 6.  PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS CLAIMING THAT THE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF
              INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS HAS A STRONG EFFECT ON WHETHER DIRECT
                                      INVESTMENTS WILL BE MADE, BY TYPE OF FACILITY, 1991
Sector Sales and
Distribution
Basic
Production
and
Assembly
Component
Manufacture
Complete
Products
Manufacture
R&D
Facilities
Average
Chemicals 19 46 71 87 100 65
Transport Equipment 17 17 33 33 80 36
Electrical Equipment 15 40 57 74 80 53
Food Products 29 29 25 43 60 37
Metals 20 40 50 50 80 48
Machinery 23 23 50 65 77 48
Average 20 32 48 59 80 48
Source: EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (International Fin. Corp. Discussion Paper 19, 1994).
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TABLE 7.  PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS CLAIMING THAT INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION IS TOO WEAK TO PERMIT TYPES OF
INVESTMENT, 1991
Country Chemicals Transport
Equip.
Electrical
Equip.
Food
Products
Metals Machinery Average
Panel A: Joint Ventures with Local Partners
Argentina 40 0 29 12 0 27 18
Brazil 47 40 31 12 0 65 32
India 80 40 39 38 20 48 44
Indonesia 50 40 29 25 0 25 28
Mexico 47 20 30 25 0 17 22
Korea 33 20 21 12 25 26 23
Thailand 43 80 32 12 0 20 31
Averagea 49 34 30 19 6 33
Panel B: Transfer of Newest or Most Effective Technology to Wholly Owned Subsidiaries
Argentina 44 20 21 12 0 14 18
Brazil 50 40 24 12 0 39 28
India 81 40 38 38 20 41 43
Indonesia 40 20 31 25 0 23 23
Mexico 31 20 21 25 0 22 20
Korea 31 20 28 12 40 22 26
Thailand 60 80 31 12 0 18 20
Averagea 48 34 28 19 9 26
Panel C: Licensing of Newest or Most Effective Technology to Unrelated Firms
Argentina 62 0 26 12 0 29 22
Brazil 69 40 29 25 0 73 39
India 81 40 38 38 20 50 44
Indonesia 73 20 33 25 0 37 31
Mexico 56 20 28 25 0 36 28
Korea 38 20 34 12 40 29 29
Thailand 73 80 36 12 0 25 38
Averagea 65 31 32 21 9 40
Source: EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (International Fin. Corp. Dis-
cussion Paper 19, 1994).
Note: aAverage over the seven countries listed.
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TABLE 8.  ELASTICITIES OF MODES OF SUPPLY WITH RESPECT TO
DOMESTIC CHARACTERISTICS AND POLICIES
Variable Asset
Stock
Affiliate Sales Intrafirm Exports
to Affiliate
Patent
Apps.
Real GDP 0.25 0.30 0.13 0.19
Tariff Level -0.02 -0.00a -0.01 -0.01
Affiliate R&D 0.27 0.29 0.15 0.07
Distance -0.25 -0.02 -0.03 0.02
Incentives 0.97 0.24 0.13 0.17
Disincentives -0.25 -0.02 0.02 -0.01
Patent Strength in
Developing Countries
0.45 0.05 -0.02 0.69
Source: Keith E. Maskus, The International Regulation of Intellectual Property, Band
134 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIVE [REV. OF WORLD ECON.] 186 (1998).
Note: aCoefficient is not significantly different from zero.  Asset stock is total assets
of foreign non-bank affiliates of U.S. parents in $ millions; Affiliate sales is total sales
of foreign affiliates in $ millions; Intrafirm exports to affiliate is U.S. exports shipped
to affiliates in $ millions; Patent applications is number filed in the host country;
Real GDP in the host country is in $ billions; Tariff level is tariff revenues divided by
total imports; Affiliate R&D is expenditure on R&D by foreign affiliates in $ mil-
lions; Distance is kilometers of capital city from Washington, DC; Incentives is the
number of affiliates that received tax concessions in the host country divided by the
number that received tax concessions in all the sample countries; Disincentives is
number of affiliates required to employ a minimum amount of local personnel di-
vided by the number of affiliates that are so constrained in all the sample countries;
Patent strength is an endogeneity-corrected index of patent laws and enforcement.
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FIGURE 1.  INWARD VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL FDI FLOWS AS AN
ECONOMY DEVELOPS
         Inward FDI
                                                                                               Horizontal
                                                                                                 Vertical
GDP per Capita
        Cumulative FDI
       Stage
       One              Stage Two                    Stage Three                                Stage Four
GDP per Capita
Source: Kevin H. Zhang, Theory and Evidence Regarding Multinational Enterprises
and International Trade 59-64, 91-93 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Colorado (Boulder)) (on file with Author).
